SUPREME COURT, U. S.

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Supreme Court of the United States

October Term 1974

No. 74-313

WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR., NATIONAL REVIEW and M. STANTON EVANS,

Petitioner,

v.

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

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September, 1974

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No.

WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, NATIONAL REVIEW, INC., and M. STANTON EVANS,

Petitioners,

—against—

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, NATIONAL REVIEW, INC. and M. STANTON EVANS (hereinafter "petitioners" when referred to collectively) pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit entered herein.*

Opinions Below

The opinion of the Court of Appeals (WATERMAN, *J.*) is not yet reported; it appears in the appendix to this petition at page 2b. A concurring opinion by FRIENDLY, *J.*, appears at page 17b.

The opinion of the District Court (BRIEANT, *J.*) is reported at 354 F. Supp. 823; it appears in the appendix to this petition at page 19c.

* It is intended that a petition by Fulton Lewis III seeking review of a decision by the New York Court of Appeals (34 N.Y. 2d 265, 1974) involving similar facts and issues of law be filed simultaneously with this petition.

Jurisdiction

The opinion of the Court of Appeals was entered on April 30, 1974. A petition for rehearing, filed within the enlarged time ordered by the Court, was denied on July 1, 1974.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

Questions Presented for Review

1. Does prior restraint of speech under the authority of § 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act to compel the payment of dues by commentators on public affairs violate the First Amendment, especially when the commentators in good faith challenge their liability to pay dues because the union has not functioned as their "exclusive representatives" as provided by § 9(a) and has conferred upon them minimal, if any, benefit?*

2. Should the National Labor Relations Act doctrine of pre-emption stated by this Court in *Motor Coach Employees* v. *Lockridge*, 403 U.S. 274 (1971), be extended to apply when (1) the effect is prior restraint of speech for an indefinite period of time, (2) the union has engaged in "misrepresentations" and "coercion", not "honest, mistaken conduct", and (3) the law on the subject is "settled"?

3. Does the Fairness Doctrine of the Federal Communications Act forbid restrictions on the employment of commentators on public affairs by broadcasting companies?

Relevant Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: FIRST AMENDMENT

> "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press . . ."

* 28 U.S.C. § 2403 may be applicable. The District Court certified to the Attorney-General that the constitutionality of the Act was drawn in question.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

§ 8(a)(3): ". . . Nothing in this act, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later, (i) if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 9(a) of this Act, in the appropriate collective bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made, . . . *Provided further*, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization . . . or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership;

§ 9(a): "Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment . . ."

Additional relevant statutes are quoted in Appendix A.

Statement of the Case

The facts are stated in some detail by the District Court at pages 35c-43c, 354 F. Supp. 826-836. This statement of facts was commended by the Court of Appeals at page 4b; the Court of Appeals summarized the facts at pages 4b-6b.

The cases arose because, under the authority of the National Labor Relations Act, the respondent union prevents petitioners from comment on public affairs unless they maintain membership in the union in good standing.

Briefly, petitioners are commentators on public affairs employed by broadcasting companies who have "collective bargaining agreements" with respondent union, the bargaining agent for the collective bargaining unit of which petitioners are members. These agreements are uniform throughout most of the industry and are known as the "Code of Fair Practice". 21c-31c.

Of particular importance here is § 84 of the TV Code (25c);* § 84 requires that the broadcasting companies

> "employ and maintain in our employment only such persons as are members (of respondent union) in good standing."

The union rests upon § 8(a)(3) as authority for this provision.

"Membership in good standing" means not only the payment of dues but also compliance with union orders; the union may order strikes, observance of picket lines, refusal to do business with employers in TV and radio, etc. 41c-42c.

In accordance with § 84 of the Code of Fair Practice, the employer broadcasting companies inserted clauses in their employment contracts with petitioners requiring them to join the respondent union.

In Buckley's case on repeated occasions representatives of the respondent union, and employer broadcasting companies under pressure from the respondent union, told him

* There are separate codes for TV and radio; § 57 of the radio Code, applicable to Evans, is identical with § 84 of the TV Code. For simplicity in presentation we shall hereafter refer exclusively to § 84.

that union membership was indispensable to his appearance on the air and in fact kept him off the air until he joined the union, 36c-38c. In the case of Evans, the broadcasting company, acting in accordance with § 84, told him that, despite his opposition to compulsory unionism, he would not be employed unless he joined the union. Under this pressure he did so, against his will. 35c-36c. Thus the simple fact is that unless a performer is a member of the union, he cannot get work.

Despite the alleged collective bargaining agreement, petitioners and the broadcasting companies negotiate directly with each other. The union does not in fact function as "exclusive representatives" in accordance with § 9(a). Petitioners' "pay, wages, hours of employment" are governed by individual contracts negotiated by themselves. 4b. Petitioners' individual bargaining efforts bring them far higher compensation than the Code of Fair Practice negotiated by respondent union.

The Complaints

The complaints, alleging jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337, sought a declaratory judgment that NLRA § 8(a)(3) was unconstitutional in so far as authorizing agreements by which petitioners were required to be members of the union in good standing, to obey the union's orders and to pay dues as a condition of comment on public affairs, and that § 84 of the Code of Fair Practice was, as to them, void and of no effect. The complaints also alleged the illegality of these requirements under the Fairness Doctrine and the NLRA.

The Answers

In its answers the union, represented by its regular counsel, maintained that the issue in the case was the constitutionality of § 8(a)(3) as applied to petitioners, and

that petitioners could constitutionally be required to be members in good standing and argued that it was constitutional (JA 97a-99a). This position presumably reflected what then was, and, except for the presentation of this case to the Court of Appeals, appears to continue to be the legal thinking of the union.

The Decision of the District Court

The District Court's opinion, foreshadowing that of this Court in *Columbia Broadcasting System* v. *Democratic National Committee*, 412 U.S. 94 (1973), found in substance that any restriction on the right of broadcasting licensees to present "conflicting views on issues of public importance" as they saw fit was forbidden by the Fairness Doctrine. Congress did not intend, the District Court reasoned, to constitute an exception to the Fairness Doctrine by § 8(a)(3). 36a-38a. The District Court did intimate that otherwise § 8(a)(3) would violate the First Amendment. 48a-54a.

As regards dues, the District Court held that inasmuch as petitioners negotiated their own contracts, the only benefit derived by petitioners from union membership was "enrollment in its pension plan". This "benefit", the Court found, was insufficient to require the payment of dues. 68c. This ruling was of course in the context of the parties presentation to the Court, a presentation to which we refer *infra* page 14.

The District Court therefore, on cross-motions, granted summary judgment declaring that, as applied to petitioners, § 84 of the Code of Fair Practice was "void and of no effect." 3b.

The Position of the Union in the Court of Appeals

Special counsel retained by the union greatly altered its position in the Court of Appeals. Special counsel argued that § 8(a)(3) required only the payment of dues; that

section forbade a requirement of membership* in other respects. As to a declaratory judgment saying this, the jurisdiction of the District Court was pre-empted by that of the National Labor Relations Board. As to the requirement of dues no constitutional question was presented because there was no "government action"—indeed the alleged lack of government action was the union's primary contention as the opinion of the Court of Appeals indicates. In any event dues were justified.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals reversed. 17b.

As seen by the Court of Appeals the First Amendment was not so "exalted" as to forbid a law effecting a prior restraint of speech "where there is a proper governmental purpose", citing *Cox* v. *New Hampshire*, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (11b). Here "Congress was understandly concerned with minimizing industrial strife" (11b), and hence prior restraint was appropriate to collect dues.

The Court of Appeals further held that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to declare that § 84, in so far as it required petitioners to be members of the union, was "void and of no effect". Primary jurisdiction over the issue of compulsory membership had been vested exclusively in the National Labor Relations Board by *San Diego Building Trades Council* v. *Garmon*, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), and *Motor Coach Employees* v. *Lockridge* 403 U.S. 274 (1971) (13b-17b).

* Or what was called "full-fledged membership," an expression apparently coined by special counsel to describe membership in the ordinary sense, as distinguished from "membership" for dues-paying purposes only. In this petition the word "membership" by itself is used to refer to what is ordinarily meant by that term.

Reasons for Granting the Writ

1. In conflict with applicable decisions of this Court, the Court of Appeals has upheld a law authorizing prior restraint of speech despite the absence of "clear support in public danger, actual or impending".*

The Court of Appeals erred, petitioners submit, in concluding that a purpose of "minimizing industrial strife" authorized Congress to enact a law providing for prior restraint of speech. In a long series of cases, *Near* v. *Minnesota*, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); *Thomas* v. *Collins*, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); *New York Times Co.* v. *United States*, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); *Murdock* v. *Pennsylvania*, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), this Court has held that reasonableness is not the test under the First Amendment. The fact that a statute meets the due process requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments does not mean that it is valid under the First Amendment. Only in cases of "public danger, actual or impending" may there be prior restraint of speech. Patently there is no such danger here, nor did Congress conceive there to be, for by § 14(b) it authorized the states to forbid both the union shop and the agency shop.

We would take issue with the Court of Appeals assertion that prohibition of prior restraint of speech has not been thus "exalted". In our view this Court has "exalted" the First Amendment, at least to that extent. And, differing with the Court of Appeals, we would say that the dues are very much "flat fees imposed directly on the exercise of a federal right" (12b).

This Court has, as we see it, specifically rejected the theory adopted by the Court of Appeals.

Thus in *Mine Workers* v. *Illinois Bar Association*, 389 U.S. 217 (1967), this Court held that laws abridging the freedom of speech (page 222):

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* *Thomas* v. *Collins*, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).

> "cannot be sustained merely because they were enacted for the purpose of dealing with some evil within the State's legislative competence, or even because the laws do in fact provide a helpful means of dealing with such an evil."

West Virginia Board of Education v. *Barnette*, 319 U.S. 624, 638-639 (1943), and *Thomas* v. *Collins*, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945), are to the same effect. On the cited pages the Court drew the distinction between the criteria applicable in First Amendment cases as contrasted with Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process cases.

The cases upholding the application to the press of "valid laws serving substantial public interests," *Branzburg* v. *Hayes*, 408 U.S. 665, 682, 683 (1972), have not involved prior restraint of speech. The Court was careful to say so, 408 U.S. 681:

> "But this case involves no intrusion upon speech or assembly, no prior restraint or restriction on what the press may publish . . ."

Other cases supporting this doctrine make the same distinction, in particular, *Cox* v. *New Hampshire*, 312 U.S. at page 573 (municipality may charge fees for use of public property). This Court expressly noted that appellants in that case "were not prosecuted for distributing leaflets, or conveying information by placards or otherwise . . ." 312 U.S. 573. The case is far from being a precedent for the Court of Appeals decision here.

THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS UPHELD THE STATUTORY COLLECTION OF DUES BY PRIOR RESTRAINT OF SPEECH ALTHOUGH (1) THE UNION DOES NOT FUNCTION AS "EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVES," (2) PETITIONERS' "PAY, WAGES, HOURS OF EMPLOYMENT" ARE GOVERNED BY EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS NEGOTIATED BY THEMSELVES, AND (3) THE INDIGNITY OF COMPULSORY UNION MEMBERSHIP HAS BEEN FOR PETITIONERS, EVEN IN A FINANCIAL SENSE, A NUISANCE, NOT A BENEFIT.

The union, as regards compulsory dues, relied on *Railway Employees Department* v. *Hanson*, 351 U.S. 225 (1956), *International Association of Machinists* v. *Street*, 367 U.S. 740 (1961), and *National Labor Relations Board* v. *General Motors*, 373 U.S. 734 (1963). None of these decisions involved prior restraint of speech, but in any event they are not applicable here.

The premise of these decisions was that the union had negotiated for the employee, in accordance with statute, the "wages, pay, hours of employment" under which the employee worked. Under these circumstances the Court reasoned, an employee who did not pay dues would be a "free rider." On the contrary, in the present case it is the union who is the "free rider", or at any rate an impostor.

The alleged benefit. The Court of Appeals, although not suggesting that the union functioned as "exclusive representatives," did find that there was sufficient benefit to warrant the collection of dues by prior restraint of speech in that the petitioners had been enrolled in the union's pension plan. No such argument had been made to the Court of Appeals by the union. This finding was specifically based on the following paragraph in the opinion of the District Court (12b-13b; 68c):

> "There is no evidence raising the factual issue contemplated by the 'free rider' cases, that is, whether these plaintiffs are in fact 'free riders', or whether they do in fact enjoy any AFTRA benefits. Apparently, these plaintiffs, by reason of union membership, are enrolled in defendant's pension plan. That is all. They each bargained for their own compensation, which is in excess of the union 'scale' or minimum, and do not appear to have benefited in any other manner."

In the District Court the union had made no claim of benefit in its extended brief. Its voluminous affidavits made no suggestion of benefit in the form of pension plan or otherwise (JA. 220a-251a). These omissions were sharply emphasized in petitioners' reply brief in the District Court. In the Court of Appeals the union did make a claim of benefit, not on the basis of the pension plan, to which no reference was made, but by reason of several obscure clauses in the Code of Fair Practice not shown to have any practical meaning to petitioners. Petitioners, therefore, had no occasion to and did not refer to the pension plan in the Court of Appeals. Under these circumstances, it was error, we believe, for the Court of Appeals, in a summary judgment case, to overrule the holding of the District Court that "enrollment" in the pension plan did not show benefit.

Even if the union had in fact functioned as "exclusive representatives" for petitioners, we would urge that a statutory scheme by which commentators on public affairs are forced to pay dues to a union under penalty of prior restraint of speech violates the First Amendment. To compel such payment on a theory of benefit of such doubtful validity as that adopted in this case makes the violation, as we see it, an even more glaring conflict with applicable decisions of this Court. *Thomas* v. *Collins*, 323 U.S. 516 (1945)*.

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* The Court noted in *Thomas* that any attempt to restrict First Amendment liberties

> ". . . must be justified by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present danger . . . Accordingly, whatever occasion would restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at appropriate time and place, must have clear support in public danger, actual or impending. Only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation." 323 U.S. 530.

Petitioners do not of course challenge the right of the union to bring an action at law to collect dues; indeed they would welcome such an action.

2. In conflict with applicable decisions of this Court, the Court of Appeals has applied the doctrine of pre-emption when (1) the union had breached its duty of fair representation by what the Court itself found to be "misrepresentation" and "coercion", (2) the law on the subject is "settled" as the union concedes, and (3) the uncertainty and time-consuming nature of recourse to the Board would, if availed of, effect a prior restraint of speech for at least a period of time.

The extension of the doctrine of pre-emption as defined in *Motor Coach Employees* v. *Lockridge* to the circumstances of this case conflicts, petitioners submit, with at least three decisions of this Court.

(1) When a union has breached its duty of fair representation by taking action towards members of the collective bargaining unit lacking in "complete good faith and honesty" and by "invidious treatment . . . in matters affecting their [such members'] employment," it cannot "fairly be implied that Congress intended exclusive jurisdiction to lie with the NLRB." *Vaca* v. *Sipes*, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), at pages 177, 179.

Here the Court of Appeals has expressly found that the union has been guilty of "misrepresentations" and "coercion," in its assertions to petitioners, directly and indirectly, that union membership was a condition of employment. Page 15b, footnote 5.*

Obviously this is not a case of "honest, mistaken conduct", 403 U.S. 301, such as was before the Court in *Lockridge.*

* The union agrees (1) that it is not entitled as a matter of law to compel membership but (2) that in fact it does so (brief in Court of Appeals, pages 28 and 12).

(2) When the law on a subject is "settled," the "expertise" of the NLRB is not needed. Hence there is no occasion for the doctrine of pre-emption. *Retail Clerks* v. *Schermerhorn*, 373 U.S. 746 (1963).

Here it has been abundantly settled since *Radio Officers Union* v. *National Labor Relations Board*, 347 U.S. 17, 40-41 (1954), that a union may not compel membership. Cf. also *National Labor Relations Board* v. *Textile Workers*, 409 U.S. 213 (1972); *Booster Lodge No. 405* v. *National Labor Relations Board*, 412 U.S. 84 (1973), and innumerable cases in the Courts of Appeals some of which are listed in *Boilermakers Local 749* v. *National Labor Relations Board*, 466 F. 2d 343 (C.A. D.C. 1972).

There is no dispute with the union—or at least with its special counsel—on this subject. In its brief in the Court of Appeals, the special counsel conceded, if he did not proclaim, that the union could not compel membership, or, as he referred to it, "full-fledged membership." (brief, page 28; quoted in footnote 5 of opinion of Court of Appeals, 14b-15b).*

The Court of Appeals also regarded the law as settled that unions could not compel membership (14b-15b); that view of the law was of course the basis of its finding that the union had been guilty of "misrepresentation" and "coercion."

When there is no dispute as to either the facts or the substantive law, surely it is an exercise in futility to preempt jurisdiction of a court which otherwise has it in favor

* Nevertheless despite this concession, the union has not revised § 84 and it continues in effect.

It so happens that at the time of the Court of Appeals decision William A. Rusher, a close associate of Buckley and publisher of National Review, was negotiating with National Broadcasting Corpo-

(Footnote continued on next page)

of an administrative body in order to determine whether the facts constitute the kind of injury for which that body is authorized to grant relief. According to *Retail Clerks* v. *Schermerhorn* that exercise in futility is not required.

(Footnote continued from previous page)

ration employment to comment on public affairs. In response to his protest against joining the union, he received the following letter:

"Letterhead of NBC News

Earl Ubell, Director
Television News—New York

May 16, 1974

Dear Mr. William Rusher:

Enclosed please find copies of a contract proposal setting forth the terms and conditions of your employment with us. If this proposal meets with your approval, please sign and return all three copies.

You will note that under the terms of paragraph 16 in this proposal you are obligated to become a member of AFTRA. I am aware of your feelings with respect to joining AFTRA but I am afraid our labor agreement with AFTRA makes it impossible for us to accommodate them. Your employment with us falls under the terms of the current AFTRA Code of Fair Practice for New York Local Television Broadcasting; and, pursuant to paragraph 84 of that agreement, you must apply for membership with AFTRA no later than the 30th day following the beginning of your employment.

Should you elect not to comply with the foregoing, we will have no option except to discontinue your employment relationship with us . . .

Sincerely,

EARL UBELL

Mr. William Rusher
National Review"

Thus the concession that it could not compel membership was apparently only for the purpose of winning this case. As shown above, the union continues the practice described *supra* pages 4-5.

It is, we believe, malapropos for the Court of Appeals to say in this case (footnote 4, page 14b) that it is "judicial and legislative policy . . . that one specialized agency, the NLRB, assume the principal responsibility for shaping the law." Here the law was conclusively "shaped" by this Court in 1954 as the parties and the Court of Appeals agreed.

(3) When administrative procedure involves prior restraint of speech it will be disregarded unless the administrative body functions with the utmost expedition. *Freedman* v. *Maryland*, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). Here the invocation of the Board's procedures would result in uncertainty and delay far worse than that condemned in *Freedman*.

The Court of Appeals, recognizing petitioners' dilemma, made two suggestions, (a) that petitioners invoke 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (declaratory order section of the Administrative Procedure Act [16b]), and (b) that petitioners obtain court injunctions forbidding discharge (footnote 6; 15b). Considering these suggestions:

(a) Under the canon of statutory construction that particular statutes prevail over general ones, the limitations on the exercise of the Board's jurisdiction provided by § 10 of the Act and expounded by the dissenting opinions in *Lockridge* make invocation of the Board's declaratory order jurisdiction a tenuous remedy at best. Thus the decision to proceed would be at the discretion of the Board's General Counsel, etc.* Indeed as demonstrated by the dissenting opinion of Justice White, 403 U.S. 314-315, these limitations were deemed by this Court sufficient to warrant rejection of the doctrine of pre-emption in situations involving values of less importance than freedom of speech. Moreover, the Board has not, in so far as our research has

* The remark that Buckley "should have taken his cause to the" Board (16b) overlooks, we believe, this jurisdictional prerequisite.

disclosed, ever found that there was, or had been, an unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(2) until the complainant's employment had been terminated or denied—that is, as relevant to these petitioners there would be no unfair labor practice suffered by these petitioners until their freedom of speech had been denied, at least temporarily. Invocation of the Board's procedures would thus mean at best a delay which might in the ordinary case be compensated by a back pay award but here would mean an abridgement of speech. Even then, the hearing of their grievance would be subject to jurisdictional limitations. Under *Freedman*, therefore, the administrative procedure is to be disregarded, certainly not applied to pre-empt the jurisdiction of the courts.

(b) The suggestion that petitioners secure court injunctions against discharge fails to take into account the short term basis of employment in the TV and radio industry. Retainers are usually for single appearances only and contracts are not for more than one year. Assuming that the petitioners were able to secure such injunctions for the brief remainder of their contracts, those would be the last contracts petitioners would ever get. There is simply too much talent available to the broadcasting companies to make the employment of petitioners worth the annoyance and expense of a lawsuit. For petitioners to sue their employers would, in their opinion, mean the end of their broadcasting careers.*

Moreover, securing an injunction is most unlikely because under § 10(j) the Board and not the employee may apply for the injunction. Such injunctions are rarely

* There is irony, we submit, in Judge Friendly's comment that petitioners may avoid "disciplinary sanctions" by resigning from the union (18bb). Should petitioners resign from the union, they could no longer get work, a disability surely as effective a sanction as any discipline the union might impose.

granted and have never been granted to protect employment pending the disposition of an unfair labor practice charge.

On the other hand, in a declaratory judgment action in court it is not necessary to protect employment by injunction because the procedure permits employees to remain members in good standing while pursuing their judicial remedy. Petitioners have done so in this case.

In conclusion jurisdiction is not pre-empted because, (1) the union has been guilty of "misrepresentations" and "coercion", (2) the law on the subject is settled, and (3) recourse to the Board would involve prior restraint of speech. Each one of these factors forbids pre-emption.

Jurisdiction. The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 over any controversy which concerns "the validity, construction or enforcement of a statute regulating commerce." *Adams* v. *International Brotherhood*, 262 F. 2d 835, 839 (C.A. 10th, 1959) (here the NLRA); cf. *Shulthis* v. *McDougal*, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912). Further, the District Court had jurisdiction over the constitutionality of § 8(a)(3) in so far as requiring the payment of dues. Under *United Mine Workers* v. *Gibbs*, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), the District Court has pendent jurisdiction over the controversy respecting membership, as the controversy "derives from a common nucleus of operative fact" (page 725).

3. In conflict with applicable decisions of this Court, the Court of Appeals has failed to afford the employer-broadcasting companies unrestricted discretion in the employment of commentators on public affairs in the discharge of their duty under the Fairness Doctrine.

The District Court developed this theory at length (pages 46c et seq.).

This Court, in its decision in *Columbia Broadcasting System* v. *Democratic National Committee*, 412 U.S. 94 (1973), reached a similar conclusion respecting the Fairness Doctrine. As that decision is so recent we do not quote any of the numerous passages supporting this view.

CONCLUSION

The Court should grant a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals herein.

Respectfully submitted,

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New York, N.Y.
September, 1974

Appendix A

TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE

§ 1331. "(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs and arises under the Constitution laws or treaties of the United States."

§ 1337. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies."

TITLE 29, UNITED STATES CODE

§ 8(b) "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . .

"(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) of this section or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership; . . ."

TITLE 47, UNITED STATES CODE

§ 315. ". . . Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters in connection with the presentation of newscasts, news in-

terviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them under this chapter to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance." (This section is quoted in full at 50c-51c.)

Appendix B

Opinion of Court of Appeals (Waterman, J.)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 81—September Term, 1973

(Argued November 7, 1973 Decided April 30, 1974.)

Docket No. 73-1667

WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR., NATIONAL REVIEW, INC., and M. STANTON EVANS,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS,
Defendant-Appellant.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
Amici Curiae

Before:

WATERMAN, FRIENDLY and TIMBERS,
Circuit Judges.

Appellant labor union appeals from judgment order below, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Brieant, *J.* The district court held that appellees' rights under the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution were infringed by appellant labor union, a union having "union shop" agreements with media upon which appellees appeared. Upon appeal by the union, it is held not to be an infringement of appellees' first amendment rights to require them to pay dues to the union, and that as to other claims of infringement which are arguable unfair labor practices the National Labor Relations Board has primary jurisdiction.

Reversed and remanded.

C. DICKERMAN WILLIAMS, BAKER, NELSON & WILLIAMS, New York City; John L. Kilcullen, Edith Hakola, (District of Columbia Bar), *for Appellees.*

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, MORTIMER BECKER, EDWARD SCHLESINGER, ROBERT M. JAFFE, New York City, *for Appellant.*

GLEN M. BENDIXSEN, Chief, Spec. Litigation; Stephen C. Yohay, Attorney; Peter G. Nash, General Counsel; John S. Irving, Deputy General Counsel; Patrick Hardin, Assoc. General Counsel; Elliot Moore, Asst. Gen. Counsel, *for National Labor Relations Board.*

MELVIN L. WULF, New York City, *for American Civil Liberties Union.*

WATERMAN, *Circuit Judge:*

This is an appeal by the labor organization, American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (AFTRA) from an order entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, declaring, in part on constitutional grounds, that any provision of any collective bargaining agreement "requiring, or purporting to require, that [appellees William F. Buckley, Jr. and M. Stanton Evans] continue to be members of [appellant union, American Federation of Television and Radio Artists] pay dues to [appellant union] and/or comply with [appellant union's] orders and regulations, as a condition of" appearing on radio or television in their roles as paid commentators on public affairs is "void and of no effect."

Insofar as the appellees' responsibility to tender periodic dues to the union is nullified by the judgment below, we reverse on the merits. Moreover, inasmuch as we hold that the district court was without jurisdiction to adjudicate the other issues raised by the appellees' complaints, which pertained to compulsory union membership and to compulsory compliance with union orders and regulations, we also reverse the remaining portions of the district court's judgment.

With great care the district court accurately set forth the specific facts and circumstances from which this litigation arose. See 354 F. Supp. at 826-836.* No useful purpose would be served by a detailed repetition of the presentation so articulately and comprehensively set forth in the opinion below. Moreover, the relative narrowness of the decision we reach today renders immaterial for our purposes much of the factual background developed by the district court. We shall therefore confine our discussion of the facts to those which are within the ambit of the limited role we think a federal court can play in this dispute at the present time.

Both appellees are well-known articulate exponents of a "conservative" political philosophy. They are engaged in a plethora of activities, amongst which are regular appearances on radio and television. Mr. Buckley is the host of his own television program, "Firing Line," in which he usually engages in spirited argument guest spokesmen of "liberal" persuasion. Mr. Evans appears as a participant on the CBS radio series "Spectrum," a program in which on a regular basis a number of spokesmen for differing political and social philosophies express their opinions on topics of their own choosing.

The employing parties with whom Buckley and Evans negotiated their contracts of employment have collective

* Pages 21c-43c hereof.

bargaining agreements with AFTRA. These latter agreements, by incorporation of the union's "Code of Fair Practice," obligate the employers to employ only members of AFTRA or persons who become members of AFTRA within thirty days after the commencement of the employment relationship. This "union shop" provision is authorized, but not required, by Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(3), which reads:

> (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
>
> (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: *Provided*, That nothing in this Act, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in section 8(a) of this Act as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later. * * * * *Provided further*, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees

> uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership:

In addition, the union's constitution purports to impose upon its members responsibilities to the union in excess of those contemplated by §8(a)(3). For example, Article XVIII, Sec. 1 of the AFTRA Constitution describes the punishments to which a union member is subject for failure to fulfill those responsibilities:

> Any member who shall be guilty of an act, omission, or conduct which in the opinion of the Board is prejudicial to the welfare of the Association, or of any of its Locals, or of any of its members, as such, or any member who shall fail to observe any of the requirements of the Constitution, or of any By-Laws, rules, regulations or orders lawfully issued by the Association, any Local or any duly authorized committee or agent of said Association or Local, or any member who shall in any way be indebted to the Association or any Local thereof, may, in the discretion of the Board, be either fined, censured, suspended or expelled from membership. . . .

In their complaints in the district court the appellees challenged alleged requirements allegedly imposed upon them, that they be members of the union, that they pay dues to the union, and that they comply with all union orders and regulations. They claimed that these requirements which they allege were sought to be imposed upon them by the union constituted unreasonable restraints on the right of free speech and deprived them of their property without due process of law. The imposition of these requirements was asserted to have been "accomplished by the defendant AFTRA acting under the authority of the National Labor Relations Act."

As we have already stated, the expansive relief granted by the district court absolved appellees from union membership, from paying dues, and from complying with union regulations. For reasons that appear *infra* we hold that as to the issues of compulsory membership and compliance with union regulations, the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") had primary jurisdiction under the preemption principle of *San Diego Building Trades Council* v. *Garmon*, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959). Thus we hold that the federal district court exceeded its power in deciding these two issues, and we do not reach the merits with respect to them. Regarding the dues requirement, however, we do reach the merits and hold, contrary to the result reached by the district court, that this requirement does not abridge appellees' first amendment right of free speech.

It is elementary constitutional doctrine that the first amendment only restrains action undertaken by the Government. *Railway Employes' Dep't* v. *Hanson*, 351 U.S. 225 (1956); *Linscott* v. *Millers Falls Co.*, 440 F.2d 14 (1 Cir.), *cert. denied*, 404 U.S. 872 (1971). There is, however, a crucial corollary to this rudimentary tenet. When private action becomes imbued with a governmental character, or when the Government significantly insinuates itself into the operative activities of private parties, then action by private parties may be regarded as "state action" and, if so, will be subject to all the constitutional limitations on governmental action. *Evans* v. *Newton*, 382 U.S. 296,299 (1966); *Burton* v. *Wilmington Parking Authority*, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). Here it is alleged that the requirement found in the AFTRA Code of Fair Practice that dues be paid is "accomplished by the defendant AFTRA acting under the authority of the National Labor Relations Act." It is true that §8(a)(3) expressly

authorizes union shop agreements which may require that employees pay union dues. The section also specifically permits the discharge of an employee who fails to comply with such a dues requirement. Appellees contend that this congressional authorization makes a union shop provision contained in a collective bargaining agreement negotiated between private parties "state action". In support of this contention, appellees rely primarily on *Railway Employes' Dep't* v. *Hanson, supra,* and *Linscott* v. *Millers Falls Co., supra.* In *Railway Employes' Dep't,* the Supreme Court held that the Railway Labor Act provision comparable to § 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act transmutes otherwise private union shop agreements into "governmental action." The Railway Labor Act, however, explicitly provides that union shops are permissible despite any state law that would otherwise prohibit them, whereas Section 14 of the NLRA, on the other hand, declares that a state "right to work" law forbidding union shops will not be superseded by § 8(a)(3). However, the First Circuit in *Linscott* v. *Millers Falls Co., supra,* quoting *Railway Employes' Dep't* v. *Hanson, supra* at 232, ascribed little significance to this distinction between the two labor statutes, and found that a union shop agreement under the NLRA constituted government action because "the federal statute is the source of the power and authority by which any private rights are lost or sacrificed." 440 F.2d at 16. Appellees would have us adopt this reasoning, and after first holding that the union shop agreement is subject to constitutional scrutiny, then proceed to rule in their favor by holding that the dues requirement violates the first amendment.[1]

1. The Tenth Circuit disagrees with the First and has held that § 8(a)(3) does not render union shop agreements "government action." *Reid* v. *McDonnell Douglas Corp.,* 443 F.2d 408, 409-11 (10 Cir. 1971).

In order to establish jurisdiction to reach the merits of this first amendment claim, it might at first blush appear we must resolve the "government action" issue. But this is not necessarily so.

The line between a jurisdictional issue unrelated to the merits of an action and one which depends upon adjudication of the ultimate merits of a case is sometimes a fine line. In fact, many jurisdictional problems cannot be unqualifiedly inserted into one category or the other. It often is difficult to resolve jurisdictional issues without, in effect, reaching determinations on the merits. See, e.g., Comment, 47 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 349, 354 (1972). In *Bell* v. *Hood*, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), the Supreme Court sought to alleviate some of these conceptual incongruities by developing a practical approach. This approach allows a federal court to assume jurisdiction over an action alleging violation of the U.S. Constitution if satisfied by an initial cursory examination that there is, on the merits, a justiciable issue. In *Bell* the plaintiffs sought money damages from the defendants, Federal Bureau of Investigation agents, who were alleged to have improperly searched the plaintiffs' premises and to have falsely imprisoned the plaintiffs in derogation of their fourth and fifth amendment rights. The defendants argued that the fourth and fifth amendments represent proscriptions "against the federal government as a government" and could not support a damage suit against particular government employees for allegedly violating those proscriptions. The Court approached the issue of whether such a suit, bottomed upon alleged violations of constitutional limitations, was maintainable—an issue somewhat analogous to the issue of whether a suit alleging violation of the first amendment can be maintained against the private party, AFTRA,

here. In *Bell* the Court held that, in the circumstances there alleged, federal jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiffs' claims on the merits could *only* be defeated by a showing that an alleged violation of the Constitution is really immaterial to the practical resolution of the litigation and was raised solely for the purpose of achieving jurisdiction, or by a showing that the claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous. *Id.* at 682-683.

So here, when we apply the practical test of *Bell*, we conclude, without having to decide the issue of whether AFTRA's dues requirement is "government action," that the district court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the appellees' claims that AFTRA's dues requirement impinges upon appellees' first amendment rights. First of all, the constitutional claim is neither "immaterial" nor presented "solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction." More importantly, although the government action aspect of the claim may be a close question, the claim is not an insubstantial or frivolous one. Indeed, the contrary is true. For instance, an examination of the contrasting views expressed in the majority and concurring opinions in *Linscott* v. *Millers Falls Co.*, *supra*, convinces us that the claim appellees here assert under the Constitution is not made insubstantial and frivolous because of its "government action" aspect.

Having established that we have jurisdiction to decide whether AFTRA's requirement that appellees pay its prescribed dues violates appellees' first amendment rights, we hold there is no violation. In so deciding, we do not need to reacth the issue of whether government action is involved. We conclude that even if it were, which we do not intimate, the dues requirement is not constitutionally infirm.

Acts of speech and of expression, although protected by the first amendment, are not so exalted that they can never be, even indirectly, obstructed. *Cox* v. *New Hampshire*, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). Indeed, even with reference to freedom of the press, the Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed what has long been understood to be the law: "[O]therwise valid laws serving substantial public interests may be enforced against the press as against others, despite the possible burden that may be imposed." *Branzburg* v. *Hayes*, 408 U.S. 665, 682-683 (1972). More specifically, where there is a proper governmental purpose for imposing a restraint and where the restraint is imposed so as not to "unwarrantedly abridge" acts normally comprehended within the first amendment, there is no abridgment of first amendment rights. *Cox* v. *New Hampshire*, *supra* at 574. Nor is there any abridgment of first amendment rights arising from the congressional authorization granting a union the power to collect dues from employees in a "union shop." The congressional purpose in authorizing mandatory union dues is surely a permissible one, for Congress was understandably concerned with minimizing industrial strife and thereby insuring the unimpeded flow of commerce. It was the legislative judgment that these goals are most easily realized if a suitable collective bargaining apparatus exists, see, e.g., *International Association of Machinists* v. *Street*, 367 U.S. 740, 760 (1961), and so the national labor laws provide for an exclusive bargaining agent to represent each discrete employee bargaining unit. See, e.g., §9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §159(a). To enable these agents to fulfill their statutory responsibility to represent all the employees while collectively bargaining with the employer, the statutes permit the levying of mandatory dues on all employees who will reap the benefits of the union's representation of them in the contract negotia-

tions with the employer. A required tolerance of "free riders," i.e., those who enjoy the benefits of the union's negotiating efforts without assuming a corresponding portion of the union's financial burden, would result not only in flagrant inequity, see, e.g., *NLRB* v. *General Motors Corp.*, 373 U.S. 734, 740-743 (1963); *Radio Officers' Union* v. *NLRB*, 347 U.S. 17, 41 (1954). but might also eventually seriously undermine the union's ability to perform its bargaining function. It is thus manifest that the statutory treatment of mandatory union dues serves a "substantial public interest."

Moreover, we find that the means adopted to achieve this proper purpose of reducing industrial strife are reasonable, and do not "unwarrantedly abridge" free speech. The dues here are not flat fees imposed directly on the exercise of a federal right. See *Murdock* v. *Pennsylvania*, 319 U.S. 105, 113-114 (1943). To the contrary, assuming *arguendo* that government action is involved here, the dues more logically would constitute the employee's share of the expenses of operating a valid labor regulatory system which serves a substantial public purpose. If there is any burden on appellees' free speech it would appear to be no more objectionable than a "nondiscriminatory [form] of general taxation" which can be constitutionally imposed on the communication media. *Branzburg* v. *Hayes*, 408 U.S. 665, 683 (1972); *Grosjean* v. *American Press Co.*, 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).

Appellees also contend that they did not seek, and do not desire, to be represented by the union and that as they have not derived any substantial benefit from the union's representation they are not "free riders." The district judge accepted this contention, and although he found that the appellees derived some benefit from their memberships in union pension plans, he regarded this as not being sub-

stantial enough to make the appellees "free riders." We disagree with the district court. There is no rational basis for distinguishing between the degrees of benefit one enjoys as a result of a union's bargaining efforts on his behalf.[2]

Turing now to the allegations that on pain of loss of employment the requirements of compulsory union membership and compulsory compliance with union regulations also violate the constitutional rights of plaintiffs to be employed by the media, we hold that the district court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate these matters. Although appellees' complaints do not explicitly allege violations of §§8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2),[3] they do aver the commission of acts which we find are "arguable" unfair labor practices under those sections of the NLRA. When unfair labor practices are alleged "the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board." *San Diego Building Trades Council* v. *Garmon, supra* at 245; accord, *Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees* v. *Lockridge*, 403 U.S. 274 (1971).

Both Buckley and Evans claim that they have not only been compelled to pay dues to the union but have also been

2. Of course we do not decide whether employees who have derived *no* demonstrable benefit from a union's efforts are "free riders."

3. Such allegations are unnecessary.

> Assuredly the proposition that Lockridge's complaint was not subject to the excluisve jurisdiction of the NLRB because it charged a breach of contract rather than an unfair labor practice is not tenable. Pre-emption, as shown above, is designed to shield the system from conflicting regulation of conduct. It is the conduct being regulated, not the formal description of governing legal standards, that is the proper focus of concern. *Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees* v. *Lockridge*, 403 U.S. 274, 292 (1971).

"required" to join the applicable local organization and to comply with union rules and regulations.[4] The union does not deny that its representatives informed Buckley that the ultimate penalty for failing to remain a "full-fledged" member would be his discharge from employment. It is abundantly clear that an "arguable" unfair labor practice would result if the union should carry out this threat.[5]

4. The imposition of the "requirements" of membership and compliance with union rules is, as we shall demonstrate, conduct by which the union *arguably* violates § 8 of the National Labor Relations Act. As such, it is subject to the preemptive jurisdiction of the NLRB, *San Diego Building Trades Council* v. *Garmon*, supra. Abstention by the federal district courts is necessary to prevent "conflicting regulation of conduct." *Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees* v. *Lockridge*, supra at 292. The dues requirement which we have already considered stands on a different footing, however. Not only is that requirement not arguably violative of § 8, as it must be for the jurisdiction of a federal district court to be preempted, it is incontestably *authorized* by that section. Deferring to the NLRB on the dues question is thus mandated neither by the *Garmon* test itself nor by the *Garmon* philosophy of fostering uniform and consistent treatment of the modes of conduct that Congress has sought to prohibit in § 8 of the National Labor Relations Act.

Furthermore, our retention of jurisdiction over the dues claim does not render this case a proper occasion for the invocation of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Application of the doctrine is discretionary *Winnick* v. *Manning*, 460 F.2d 545, 550 (2 Cir. 1972); C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 19, at 64 (2d ed. 1970), and seems particularly inappropriate under the circumstances here where the membership and rules compliance issues are distinct from the dues claim, and do not constitute alternative theories on the same pivotal facts as the dues claim, and where the judicial and legislative policy favoring uniform treatment of conduct arguably constituting unfair labor practices demands that one specialized agency, the NLRB, assume the principal responsibility for shaping the law.

5. See NLRA §§ 8(a)(3), 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3), (b)(2); *NLRB* v. *Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.*, 388 U.S. 175, 197 n. 37 (1967); *NLRB* v. *General Motors Corp.*, 374 U.S. 734, 742 1963. Indeed, in its brief, and at oral argument in this court the

(Footnote continued on next page)

Buckley apprises us that he refrained from resigning from the union because he feared that he would suffer loss of media employment and also incur the significant hardships that would undoubtedly accompany such a discharge.[6]

(Footnote continued from previous page)

union concedes that "the imposition of obligations of membership other than dues-payment will depend on continued full-fledged membership, which . . . cannot be imposed on pain of loss of employment."

The union also acknowledges that Buckley and Evans can avoid any other sanctions which the union might seek to impose on them by resigning from "full-fledged membership while continuing to pay dues." The union attempts to qualify this concession, however, by noting that "whether Buckley and Evans can freely exercise [the right to resign from full-fledged membership] depends on circumstances." The union's assumption that Buckley and Evans can currently be considered "full-fledged" members is suspect. At least in Buckley's case, the misrepresentations made to him that to retain his employment he was required to be and to remain a full-fledged AFTRA member appear to be sufficient to vitiate any "consent" he may have given to becoming and remaining a full-fledged member. *Sheraton-Kauai Corp.* v. *NLRB*, 429 F.2d 1352, 1357, (9 Cir. 1970).

As to whether there are issues of arguable unfair labor practices, we would point out that the union may have already violated § 8(b)(1) of the NLRA by "coercing" Buckley, and possibly Evans, into becoming full-fledged members of the union. Under § 7 of the Act, Buckley apparently had the right to refrain from becoming a full-fledged member. The union's misrepresentations to him regarding his obligations to the union appear to have effectively coerced Buckley into incurring responsibilities he was not required to accept. Coercion may be "inferred" from the success of these misrepresentations. *Sheraton-Kauai Corp.* v. *NLRB*, supra at 1357.

6. We note that the appellees' right to continued media employment will not be endangered should they seek to crystallize their controversies with the union by resigning from full-fledged union membership. As long as they forward dues to the union they through NLRB intervention, should be able to obtain a federal district court injunction against their discharge from employment, see 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), pending disposition of any litigation which might follow resignations. A threat of irreparable injury would exist, and, as we have explained, and as the union has conceded, there would be an excellent chance that Buckley and Evans would succeed on the merits of a claim that the payment of dues is a sufficient compliance.

Buckley's decision not to resign was not an unreasonable decision, and it did not bar him from seeking declaratory relief. But inasmuch as the union conduct to which Buckley objects constituted arguable unfair labor practices, his selection of forum was incorrect. He should have taken his cause to the National Labor Relations Board, an administrative agency fully capable of granting declaratory relief to him if circumstances warrant such relief. See 5 U.S.C. §554(e).

The only oral representations made to Evans were those made by his prospective employer. The substance of these remarks was that before Evans could appear on the "Spectrum" Radio Series, Evans had to join the union because the employer's collective bargaining agreement mandated it. It also seems that Evans, as well as Buckley, believes that the requirements of compulsory membership, and the duty to comply with union rules and regulations, are imposed on him by the combination, on the one hand, of § 84 of AFTRA's Code of Fair Practice to which Evans's employer is subject under the collective bargaining agreement it has with AFTRA, and, on the other, Article XVIII of the AFTRA Constitution, to which Evans himself would appear to be subject as a "full-fledged" member of the union. Section 84 is the compulsory unionism clause, i.e., the provision obligating the employer to employ only those persons who are AFTRA members in good standing, or those who become such AFTRA members within thirty days of the inception of the employment relationship. Article XVIII of the AFTRA Constitution, quoted *supra*, gives the union the power to expel from membership any member who "shall fail to observe" any union rule or regulation. At first glance, the union would seem to have attempted to reserve to itself the power to force an employer to discharge an employee by the simple

expedient of expelling the employee from union membership for any real or imagined infraction of its rules or regulations. On the other hand, §§ 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2)'s substantial limitation on the ability of the union to so affect the employment relationship appears to receive implicit recognition in § 84 itself, which provides for automatic amendment of the section if the NLRA should be "repealed or amended so as to permit a stricter union security clause (emphasis added)." Evans's case is distinguishable from Buckley's case in that Evans's case relies principally on these bread union-drafted documents rather than on the highly specific warnings Buckley received. However, in any event, it is the function of the NLRB to ascertain whether Evans's controversy is sufficiently developed to enable it to declare the rights of the parties, and, if the controversy has so evolved, whether the union commits or would commit unfair labor practices by indulging in the conduct about which Evans is apprehensive.

Reversed and remanded.

FRIENDLY, *Circuit Judge*, concurring:

I concur in the result and in the majority's holding that § 8(a)(3) is constitutional insofar as it permits a union to require employees in a union shop to pay ordinary dues and fees even if the employees are radio and television commentators. However, I disagree that the issues of compulsory membership and compliance with union regulations, as presented on this appeal, fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. The appellees sought a declaratory judgment that AFTRA's union security agreement, authorized by § 8(a)(3) of the Act, violated their constitutional rights, in part because it would expose them to union discipline and require them

to become union members. Federal courts must give way to the National Labor Relations Board when the claim is that the conduct in question violates the unfair labor practice provisions of the NLRA. And to the extent that the appellees contend that the union would be committing an unfair labor practice by imposing fines or otherwise disciplining them, I agree that their claim is preempted. However, the real thrust of appellees' argument seems rather to be that the Act authorizes the union to discipline them and is therefore unconstitutional. Since the preemption doctrine does not extend to constitutional attacks on the National Labor Relations Act, see *Seay* v. *McDonnell Douglas Corp.*, 427 F.2d 1002-04 (9 Cir. 1970); *Lewis* v. *AFTRA*, 71 Misc. 2d 253, 336 N.Y.S.2d 56 (Sup. Ct. 1972), *aff'd*, 41 App. Div. 2d 707, 341 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1st Dep't 1973), the district court's jurisdiction over the constitutional claims in this case was not preempted. However, as the court points out in footnote 5, and as the union concedes, an employee under the union shop provision of the Act need not accept "full-fledged" membership in the union, and thus can avoid the disciplinary sanctions to which "full-fledged" members may be subjected. Under this construction, I see no constitutional infirmity in § 8(a)(3) even as applied to persons whose First Amendment protection is of peculiar importance.

Appendix C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

71 Civ. 3920

M. STANTON EVANS,

Plaintiff,

—against—

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS,

Defendant.

WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR. and NATIONAL REVIEW, INC.,

Plaintiffs,

—against—

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS,

Defendant.

Opinion of District Court (Brieant, J.)

These causes have been consolidated at the instance of plaintiffs by an order of this Court (Pierce, J.) made December 3, 1971.

By order to show cause dated March 3, 1972, issued by Judge Tenney, plaintiffs in each action moved for summary judgment to be entered under Rule 56, F.R.Civ.P., "declaring void, illegal and unconstitutional §8(a)(3) [29 U.S.C. §158(a)(3)] of the National Labor Relations Act, insofar as that statute may be deemed to authorize defendant's agreements with networks, broadcasters, stations and other employers in the television and radio industry which require or may purport to require plaintiffs . . . to continue to be members of the defendant . . . pay dues . . . and comply with defendant['s] regulations and orders as a condition of the production or broadcasting certain programs known as 'Firing Line', 'Spectrum' and/or other

programs on which plaintiffs . . . may appear, and further, declaring that plaintiffs Buckley and National Review, Inc. may continue to make and sell the package show Firing Line and that plaintiffs . . . may continue to appear on television and radio as they see fit, irrespective of continued membership in defendant, the payment by them of . . . dues and their compliance with defendant['s] regulations and orders, all without harassment or interference by defendant . . . and further enjoining defendant . . . from threatening any network, broadcaster, station or other employer in the television and radio industry with any proposed action or otherwise or taking any action by reason of its employment of or intended employment of plaintiffs . . . on any television or radio show, or its use, or intended use, of a package show in which plaintiffs . . . appear, and further enjoining defendant . . . from threatening to take or taking punitive action of any kind whatever against plaintiffs should plaintiffs Buckley and Evans withdraw from membership in defendant . . . or fail to pay dues . . . or comply with any order of defendant. . . ."

By notice of motion dated May 3, 1972, defendant also moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaints and the consolidated action for "lack of jurisdiction, [and] failure to state a claim against defendant upon which relief can be granted."

Both causes have been at issue for some time. Adequate discovery appears to have been conducted by deposition and interrogatories. With a reservation, not considered significant for purposes of this motion,[1] all parties concede that there are no contested material issues of fact. The Court finds that no contested issues of fact prevent disposition of these motions. Both plaintiffs seek to enforce rights said to be protected pursuant to the First, Fifth and Ninth Amend-

1. See *infra* p. 6, *et seq.*

ments to the Constitution of the United States, and more specifically, First Amendment rights.[2]

The Parties

M. Stanton Evans, plaintiff in 71 Civ. 3920, is a paid radio commentator, or analyst, of news, current events, politics, social, economic, religious, moral and ethical problems—all of the great issues which divide us.[3] Pursuant to written contract with CBS News, a division of the Columbia Broadcasting System which owns and operates radio stations, and furnishes material which may be broadcast pursuant to license by other affiliated stations, Evans, referred to therein as "Artist", on his own responsibility, and not as a "staff employee", writes his own material and selects his own subject matter. He enjoys substantial

2. These actions appear to be within the purview of 28 U.S.C. § 2403, because the litigation draws in question the constitutionality of an Act of Congress affecting the public interest. This Court, on its own motion, raised the question of applicability of § 2403 of Title 28, which permits intervention of the United States as a party in such an action. After consultation with counsel, this aspect of the litigation was, pursuant to Rule 24 of the General Rules of this District, brought to the attention of Chief Judge Edelstein. On October 18, 1972, Chief Judge Edelstein issued a certificate, pursuant to § 2403, and stayed all further proceedings for a period of thirty (30) days from that date, subject to enlargement of time, so as to permit the motion to intervene. No such motion was made.

The issues have been fully briefed. Defendant is entirely capable of representing the public interest in the action, and the litigation is adversary, and not collusive.

3. For brevity, one following that calling is hereafter referred to merely as a "commentator", or "analyst". Excluded from the definition of commentator are those who merely read news or comments prepared by others, and for which they have no substantial editorial responsibility. Also excluded, unless the context indicates otherwise, are those who comment only on such uncontroversial subjects as the weather, and with respect to whom no personal First Amendment rights could be asserted.

freedom of expression. While CBS News personnel, in their discretion, may determine whether any program shall be broadcast, CBS may not, without Evans' prior consent, alter Evans' original creative work. Evans, pursuant to the contract, holds CBS harmless for damages and expenses including counsel fees, arising out of the use of any materials furnished by him or words spoken by him [e.g. plagiarism or slander].

The viewpoint and position (or "bias") which Evans reflects is conservative. He alleges that he is ". . . generally considered a spokesman for the conservative point of view on politics and national and international affairs".

Broadcasting is neither his primary nor full-time occupation, which is that of editor of the *Indianapolis* (Ind.) *News*, a substantial daily newspaper. He is a prominent national figure, and is an author of books and essays, a lecturer and debator. It is this independent status, and his standing as author and lecturer, which creates public interest in his opinions, which are not those of the producer, station or network.

William F. Buckley, Jr., plaintiff in 71 Civ. 146, is a public figure. He has been a candidate for Mayor of New York City and speaks regularly on current events, politics, social, economic and religious subjects. He appears with some frequency on television, and as a paid lecturer. He writes a syndicated newspaper column entitled "On The Right", published three times a week by over 320 newspapers, in which he writes as a commentator and analyst of news, current events, politics, social, economic, religious, moral and ethical problems. He is the principal participant of what he characterizes as a "TV Show" called "Firing

Line",[4] and appears often as a guest with or without pay on other television programs, particularly television panel discussions of public events and issues.

He has written magazine articles and books. It is difficult to state with certainty what his primary or full-time occupation is; however, he serves as editor of a magazine, "National Review", and, like Evans, is probably not engaged in broadcasting as his primary or full-time occupation.

Buckley too, is a conservative. He has submitted on the motion a description of his professional standing prepared by Professors Leonard W. Levy and Arthur Young, General Editors of the American Heritage series of books as a foreword to the book "Did You Ever See a Dream Walking?", an anthology of American conservative opinion of which Buckley was the editor. Professors Levy and Young write in relevant part:

> "Mr. Buckley is the foremost expositor of rational, humanistic conservative thought in America today. He is a man for all conservative seasons: author, politician, TV star, popular lecturer and editor-in-chief of the nation's leading journal of conservative opinion, *National Review*. In every capacity he is an outstanding educator, though not an academician. Famed as a tough-minded adversary, an entertaining and brilliant conversationalist, and a scintillating stylist, he is also an enormously learned man and

4. The Court has never watched "Firing Line", but accepts plaintiff's description of this program as essentially serious, and issue oriented, rather than mere entertainment. While a "show" is defined as a "theatrical production", it also includes "[any] radio, or television program" and "any kind of public exhibition or exposition". See Random House Dictionary of the English Language, p. 1320, New York 1966.

> a serious thinker. His introduction to this book is written with his characteristic charm, wit, ego, trenchancy, and, of course, strong bias . . . Mr. Buckley is eclectic. . . . He flatly rejects the intolerant and rigid dogmatism of Ayn Rand, the extreme and unrealistic anti-statism of conservatives who verge on anarchism, and the apoplectic and reckless reactionarism (sic) of the John Birchers with their conspiracy theories. Mr. Buckley's conservatism shares nothing in common with the conservatism of Big Business or of the self-appointed super-patriots, bigots and xenophobes."

Plaintiff National Review, Inc., of which Buckley is President, and sole shareholder, is a co-producer of "Firing Line", together with RKO General, Inc., a broadcaster. "Firing Line" is a regular television program known in the television industry as a "package show" because it is produced and broadcast pursuant to contract. On about March 31, 1971, Southern Educational Communications Association ("SECA"), supplanted RKO General as to future Firing Line programs, under a new contract between National Review and SECA, pursuant to which Firing Line was to be produced for distribution to over 200 non-commercial TV stations, by SECA, whose performance was guaranteed by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.

Production originally took place in New York, but later, by contract, production was effectuated in numerous places, and at various television studios or stations throughout the United States.

Defendant American Federation of Television and Radio Artists ("Aftra") is an unincorporated association organized under the laws of the State of New York and affiliated with the AFL-CIO. It is in essence a labor union,

or collective bargaining agent, for artists engaged in the fields of radio and television. It has locals in New York, and in many other places throughout the country where television and radio productions originate.

Facts

Aftra is, and for many years prior to 1967 was, a collective bargaining agent, and is a "labor organization" as defined by the National Labor Relations Act. [29 U.S.C. §152(5).][5] Wherever permitted by state law, Aftra has bargained for, and obtained, union shop conditions, with RKO General, Inc., Columbia Broadcasting System and many other television and radio producers, networks and broadcasters. These contracts incorporate by reference, as in the nature of a contract of adhesion, a so-called "Code of Fair Practice". Section 84 of Aftra's Code of Fair Practice for the television industry reads in relevant part as follows:

> "84. Union Shop
>
> Until and unless the union security provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, as amended, are repealed or amended so as to permit a stricter union security clause the following provisions shall apply:
>
> 'It is agreed that during the term of this agreement, we will employ and maintain in our employment only such persons covered by this agreement

5. The statute reads in part as follows:

"(5) The term 'labor organization' means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, or dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work."

as are members of the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists in good standing or as shall make application for membership on the thirtieth (30th) day following the beginning of employment hereunder or the date of execution of this agreement, whichever is the later, and thereafter maintain such membership in good standing as a condition of employment.'

In the event the said Act is repealed or amended so as to permit a stricter union security clause the above provision shall be deemed amended accordingly. The provisions of this paragraph are subject to said Act."

This provision has been in effect for some years and is specifically authorized in New York and elsewhere by §8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(3), which reads in relevant part as follows:

"§158. Unfair labor practices

(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—

• • •

(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: PROVIDED, That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, which ever is the later, . . . PROVIDED FURTHER, That no employer shall justify any dis-

> crimination against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization . . . if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership;
>
> * * *
>
> (b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
>
> (1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title: PROVIDED, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein; . . ."

Aftra also has a Code of Fair Practice for radio broadcasting, as distinguished from television broadcasting. This Code, applicable to plaintiff Evans by Section 57 thereof, provides for union shop conditions in terms substantially identical to that imposed in the television industry.[6]

For some time prior to November 16, 1966, the provisions of the Aftra television codes defined the "People Covered", artists for whom Aftra was the collective bargaining agent, in a manner which would have excluded plaintiffs. Section 11 of the 1950 Code read in part as follows:

> 11. PEOPLE COVERED:
>
> All persons engaged as talent, e.g., actors; comedians; masters-of-ceremonies; quiz masters; disc

6. See, *e.g.* § 55 and 57 of Aftra 1969-72 National Code of Fair Practice For Commercial Radio Broadcasting, Exhibit 5, depositions of plaintiff Evans, page 25.

> jockeys; singers; dancers; announcers, (other than staff duties of staff announcers); sportscasters; specialty acts; walk-ons; extras; puppeteers; reporters and analysts (with the exception of government employees and persons who are engaged occasionally on a single program basis because they are specialists whose regular employment or activity is in the field in which they report, such as college professors and scientists) in the fields of home economics, fashions, farm and rural subjects, and market reports; models; moderators; members of panel where format of program requires such persons to participate generally in entertainment. Excluded from the provisions of this agreement are *Excluded from the provisions of this agreement are members of panel who take part in discussion of news, education, or public affairs programs, or persons who act only as judges of contests.* (Underlining Added)

The above provision was found in the first television contract, effective December 8, 1950, entered into by Television Authority [which later merged with American Federation of Radio Artists ("Afra") to form "Aftra"] with the network companies and other producers of television programs.

Beginning with the 1956-1958 Aftra Code of Fair Practice for Network Television Broadcasting, an effort was made to distinguish services rendered in the field of news by commentators and analysts from the services performed by others who were not employed as commentators or analysts.

The coverage provisions of the Code effective 1963-1966, read in part as follows:

> 75. PEOPLE COVERED:
>
> Excluded from the provisions of this agreement are members of panel who take part in discussion of

news, education, or public affairs programs, or persons who act only as judges of contests.

This Code also applies to all persons rendering services in the field of news including but not limited to persons who criticize, review and/or comment on the following: books, the fine arts, music, sports, the theatre, movies, dance, radio, television, society, and travel and including persons who perform in live, film, or recorded news inserts in network television programs. However, commentators and analysts in the field of news (other than persons who criticize, review and/or comment as set forth in the preceding sentence) are excluded from the coverage of this Code on any program upon which they are performing (among other services in the field of news) services in the capacity of commentator and analyst; this exclusion shall apply to services in the field of news performed by a commentator or analyst on a program series in the field of news where such services as analyst or commentator (other than as a person who criticizes, reviews and/or comments as set forth in the preceding sentence) are performed on a substantial number of the programs on which the commentator or analyst so performs on such series.

By the Code effective November 16, 1966 (1966-1969 Code) coverage extended to all persons other than staff newsmen rendering services in the field of news, expressly including commentators and analysts, ending the prior distinctions that had been made. Its Section 75 reads in part as follows:

75. PEOPLE COVERED:

Excluded from the provisions of this agreement are members of panel who take part in discussion

> of news, education, or public affairs programs, or persons who act only as judges of contests; provided that services of staff newsmen on such panel programs shall be subject to their respective staff agreements.
>
> This Code also applies to all persons other than staff newsmen rendering services in the field of news including but not limited to commentators and analysts and persons who criticize, review and/or comment on the following: books, the fine arts, music, sports, the theatre, movies, dance, radio, television, society, and travel; and including persons who perform in live, film, or recorded news inserts in network television programs. However, management personnel delivering editorials are excluded from the coverage of this Code.

The same coverage pertaining to commentators and analysts rendering services in the field of news is contained in the 1969-1972 Code, and in the staff newsmens' agreement entered into by Aftra with the network companies. It remains effective.

Plaintiffs contend that the industry Codes of Fair Practice imposed on them by Aftra as a result of contracts with employers, constitute *per se* an unreasonable prior restraint on their freedom of speech, guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. They assert that they are exposed to union discipline. Provisions of the Aftra constitution imposing this discipline read in relevant part as follows:

> "Any member who shall be guilty of an act, omission, or conduct which in the opinion of the Board is prejudicial to the welfare of the Association, or of any of its Locals, or of any of its members, as

> such, or any member who shall fail to observe any of the requirements of the Constitution, or of any By-Laws, rules, regulations or others lawfully issued by the Association, any Local or any duly authorized committee or agent of said Association or any Local or any member who shall in any way be indebted to the Association or any Local thereof, may, in the discretion of the Board, be either fined, censured, suspended or expelled from membership. The Board may discipline a member for each and every offense or violation, and no member shall be exempt from disciplinary action because of any previous action of the Board upon some other or different charge." (Article XVIII, Sec. 1)

In addition, the New York Local of Aftra, [and presumably other locals] imposes on members the following obligations as found in Article X of the Aftra New York Constitution, which reads in relevant part as follows:

> "[The Local may] . . . order its members to refrain for a given time or until further order of the Local Board under specified conditions or in any manner whatsoever from working for, dealing with, or having any business relations with anyone or more employers, producers, networks, stations, advertising agencies, sponsors, independent packagers, transcription companies, phonograph recording companies, agents, managers, impresarios or other persons connected with the radio, television, phonograph record business."

Plaintiffs view this element of union discipline, and the entire matter of being required to join a union in order to express their own opinions and to present analysis and commentary having a conservative bias, as unlawful and constituting an unreasonable prior restraint and also as

having a chilling effect on their First Amendment rights. We are thus tendered the issue as to whether this union jurisdiction, achieved through Act of Congress (*supra*, p. 10) is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiffs' segment of radio and television employment.

As previously noted, the first television contract, effective December 8, 1950, made by Aftra's predecessor with the network companies and other producers of television programs, contained a "People Covered" provision which defined those members of the collective bargaining unit as persons engaged as "talent". Excluded from coverage as "talent", and therefore not defined as "artists" were those persons who "are members of panel who take part in discussion of news, education or public affairs programs".

The affidavit of Kenneth Groot, Executive Secretary of Aftra's New York Local, which affidavit is sworn to April 26, 1972, points out that "as the news bulletins, newscasts, news programs and news documentaries became increasingly important in television, the network companies contended that the commentators and analysts in the field of news should be excluded from the scope of the contract 'beacuse the requirement of union membership might somehow infringe their right to speak freely'."

Mr. Groot observes that the exclusion of news commentators and analysts from the coverage of the collective bargaining agreements "took on extra significance because producers began to classify ordinary news reporters as analysts to keep them out of the bargaining unit".

Such technique is not unheard of in industrial unionism, where employers attempt to exalt production workers into "foreman" or "management" status, so as to exclude them from the bargaining unit and prevent them from voting in recognition elections.

We think, however, that this threat to union security could have been met by making factual determinations on an *ad hoc* basis; management permitting an announcer or reporter the opportunity to disgorge an occasional *ad lib* will not make him a commentator or analyst. Reasonable administration of the prior union contract should have avoided this difficulty.

Effective November 15, 1966, as Mr. Groot's affidavit notes, the National Code of Fair Practice for network television broadcasting was made applicable to all persons other than staff newsmen rendering services in the field of news. Expressly included were commentators and analysts. Staff newsmen, as distinguished from free lance newsmen, also became covered under separate agreements.

We must remember the admonition that "We are not to shut our minds as Judges to truths that all others can see and understand."[7]

It is obvious that these changes in the persons included in the collective bargaining unit were arrived at as a result of collective bargaining between Aftra and its membership on the one hand, and the employers, broadcasters and producers on the other. Such bargaining presumes a *quid pro quo.* Whether the employers gave up the prior exclusions enjoyed with respect to commentators in order to gain some economic benefit for themselves in

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7. This quotation was attributed to Chief Justice Taft by (then) Judge Cardozo, in *McGovern* v. *City of New York*, 234 N.Y. 377, 392 (1923), who there referred to *Bailey* v. *Drexel Furniture Co.*, 259 U.S. 20 (1921). In *Bailey*, the Supreme Court, referring to a tax on the employment of child labor, wrote, per Chief Justice Taft:

> "[A] court must be blind not to see that the so-called tax is imposed to stop the employment of children within the age limits prescribed. Its prohibitory and regulatory effect and purpose are palpable. All others can see and understand this. How can we properly shut our minds to it?

some other aspect of their labor relations is of no great importance. The public, and those who would be commentators and analysts enjoying full First Amendment rights, were not participants in, nor are they barred by the results of such bargaining, in which the employers, on plaintiffs' theory of the case, sold out the freedom from prior union restraint previously enjoyed by a limited group of news commentators and analysts.

Interestingly, at the same time, the employers bargained for freedom from union discipline on the part of those persons characterized as "management personnel" who merely read the expressions of editorial opinion written by the owners.[8]

Both Aftra and the employers with whom these plaintiffs have had dealings, interpret the Code to include commentators and analysts who express their own philosophical bias [who, in effect, editorialize in support of their own opinions, rather than for the opinions of ownership, as the exempted employees do], as being within the bargaining unit. They are persons for whom full membership in Aftra, and compliance with union discipline is a condition precedent to speech, at least in New York and many other states.

Additional contracts between Aftra and producers prevent use of unionized production facilities for creating tape to be rebroadcast on non-union stations, and further provide that an independent (non-network, non-station) producer must require membership on the part of the "People Covered" by the Aftra Code, or else his independent production many not be broadcast on unionized stations.

8. Aftra 1966-69 Code, see *infra*, p. 14, last sentence of quotation. Of course, we cannot conclude that the sole reason the station owners bargained for and received exemption for "management personnel delivering editorials" is to protect ownership's First Amendment rights.

Plaintiffs Become Members of Aftra

As noted, written agreements binding upon CBS News, Inc. and Aftra require, among other things, that persons employed to do plaintiff Evans' work, must become and remain members of Aftra. The contract of employment between CBS News, Inc. and Evans, and his prior contract (¶ 18), provide that Evans is "bound by all the terms and provisions of the applicable Aftra National Code of Fair Practice for commercial radio broadcasting" and "will become a member of Aftra in good standing, subject to and in accordance with the provisions of said applicable Aftra Code or Agreement" and "will become and remain during the term of this agreement, a member in good standing of any labor unions or guilds with which CBS may at any time have agreements then in effect lawfully requiring such membership."

Breach of this, or other covenants of the written employment agreement are agreed grounds for reduction of compensation, or termination (¶ 19).

Evans has testified at his deposition read in support of the motion, without contradiction, that he negotiated his employment directly with a Vice President of CBS News, Inc. His mimeographed form contract contains changes and deletions made in ink. In the course of his contract negotiations, Evans was told by CBS Vice President Robinson that he would have to join Aftra. After Evans protested, Robinson advised that CBS had a contract with Aftra by reason of which CBS was required to compel Evans to join Aftra; that if he refused to join Aftra CBS simply could not engage him.

In order to obtain the employment and the opportunity to express his conservative views by radio, Evans applied for membership in, and joined Aftra.

The conduct of the CBS officer in this circumstance is nothing more than would be expected in view of the existing labor agreements. The employer had contracted in good faith that it would require all persons in Evans' area of endeavor to become members of the union within 30 days after employment. The contracting parties, including Aftra, intended that what was done, would be done by the employer, in precisely the way in which it was done. Counsel for Evans termed this "coercion".

I find that plaintiff Evans had a good faith objection to joining the union, based upon his contention that it is unconstitutional to require him to do so and in derogation of his First Amendment and related rights. He would not have joined but for the fact that Aftra bargained for and received, adherence by CBS News, Inc. to the Code aforementioned.

Buckley did not attain membership in Aftra under such simple factual circumstances. Briefly described, however, Buckley's membership, like that of Evans, was effected against his scruples, and only in order to permit him to continue to express to the public his commentary and analysis from a conservative bias. Plaintiffs' motivation in joining Aftra was not unlike that of the conversion of Henry of Navarre.

Buckley commenced his television appearances in or shortly after 1955. His early appearances were generally without compensation. In about 1964, the increasing public attention which he was receiving, and the fact that a proposed program discussing matters of public interest with Buckley as host and moderator was under consideration, resulted in an invitation from Mr. Kenneth Groot, Executive Secretary of Aftra, dated August 27, 1964, to become a member.

On September 1, 1964, Buckley, apparently early determined to sustain his First Amendment claim presently in litigation in this action, wrote and inquired whether he was free to join or not join, and asked what the sanctions used against him would be in the event he should "opt" not to join.

Mr. Groot, in an entirely courteous letter of September 3, 1964, responded, conveying the details of membership application, initiation fee and dues and advised "since Aftra has a union shop in all of its collective bargaining agreements, it is necessary that persons who appear on radio or television in Aftra covered employment be members . . . within the period prescribed by law."

Mr. Groot's letter was a fair summary of the legal effect of the Code and labor contracts upon Buckley, who replied by letter on September 22, 1964 "I have apparently no alternative than to join your union, I shall proceed to do so under protest." He states thereafter that on May 14, 1965, while appearing on a television program, an unidentified "organizer" for Aftra tendered an application form and advised that he would not be permitted to go on television again unless he became a member.

During the period immediately following this alleged attempt to enlist plaintiff in the union as required by the contracts and codes, he became a candidate for the office of Mayor of the City of New York, and no further efforts were made during this period.

In late 1965 and early 1966, apparently an RKO General employee, Yarnell, in connection with the production of the program later known as "Firing Line", took the occasion to remind Buckley of the provisions of the Code of Fair Practice and the agreement between RKO General, Inc. and Aftra which require union membership as a condi-

tion of broadcasting. It was Yarnell's duty to perform RKO's agreement with Aftra for union shop conditions. To avoid what Buckley describes as "a long legal battle in the courts" he submitted his application to join Aftra on April 1, 1966.

Previously to submitting the application on April 1, 1966, National Review, Inc. had by agreement with RKO General covenanted to abide by the Aftra Code of Fair Practice and all collective bargaining agreements. These provisions in effect require union shop conditions to be maintained by an independent producer whose work is to be broadcast over any major station or network in New York. (See p. 11 of Buckley's affidavit, sworn to February 16, 1972.) Similar provisions were embodied in subsequent contracts pursuant to which Firing Line was produced.

Section 90 of the Aftra Codes of 1966-1969 and 1969-1972 entitled "Purchase of Package Shows", read in relevant part as follows:

> 90. PURCHASE OF PACKAGE SHOWS:
>
> "Nothing in this agreement shall be construed as preventing the Producer from buying package shows from fair independent contractors; provided that the Producer must, in its agreement with the independent contractor, include a provision requiring such contractor to sign, adopt and conform to the '1969-72 AFTRA National Code of Fair Practice for Network Television Broadcasting,' and further provided that such independent contractor becomes a signatory to such Code and a signed copy of the Code is delivered by the Producer or independent contractor to AFTRA not later than 72 hours prior to the first broadcast of the program. AFTRA

> agrees with the Producer that if an independent contractor has signed this agreement and the Producer has complied with this paragraph, AFTRA will not exercise its right to strike against the independent contractor so as to create program emergencies for the Producer." (Copied from 1969-72 Code)

Buckley also asserts that he was coerced into joining Aftra, and was threatened. Defendant cavils over this choice of words. It is there that we are told issues of fact exist. Defendant's memorandum submitted on the motion (p. 15) contains the following statement:

> "Aftra categorically asserts that Mr. Buckley became an Aftra member only under pressure from RKO General. Mr. Evans testified that no representative of the union communicated with him in any way . . . and that he was compelled to become an Aftra member by his employer."

Such compulsion, applied to Evans by the employer, or in Buckley's case, by the customer for the packaged show, in behalf of itself and all other broadcasting outlets, parties to the Aftra Code, occurred by reason of the Contract, or collective bargaining agreement, between Aftra and these broadcasters. At the special instance and request of Aftra the broadcasters had agreed to enforce the contract. Mr. Groot properly observed (deposition p. 34) that "the producer who has signed the collective bargaining agreement with Aftra has an equal obligation with Aftra to observe the provisions of it. We would notify such a producer of any failure to observe those provisions which we considered to be a violation, and he would be under an obligation to see that the individual in such a case were a member of Aftra or did join the union." Later, Mr. Groot testified on deposition with respect to a hypothetical question based

upon the production of Firing Line that "... Yes, we would pursue Mr. Buckley in such a case, and we would also advise RKO of the fact. We would do both. This would be what I would do if I were handling such a matter directly."

Thus it appears that neither Buckley nor Evans could insulate themselves by not accepting employment from the employers having contracts with Aftra. Under the provisions of the Aftra Code, no matter by whom employed or paid, or even if self-employed, any "artist", as defined by the "People Covered" clauses, who appears regularly on any major network radio or television station for pay must become a member of Aftra. Groot testified that he had uniformly had compliance. Such compliance, as noted, extends to use of a station's producing facilities to create tapes not intended to be broadcast on that station, but for broadcast in another station or even in a foreign country, and this whether or not the broadcast outlet itself has such a labor contract. Mr. Groot has asserted that Buckley's work on Firing Line was that of a "moderator" and that he is an "actor" when he appears on other shows.

Further, when National Educational Television and Radio Center ("NET") broadcasts programs produced by or with the support of the "Corporation for Public Broadcasting" (a federally funded entity), Aftra requires, by reason of contractual agreements with NET that such programs likewise comply in all respects with the Code (Groot deposition, p. 60).

As to productions for broadcasts elsewhere, other than in New York, Groot testified that "Whether or not it was broadcast at that station [a station owned by a producer with whom an Aftra agreement had been executed] or broadcast at stations where we didn't have a contract, we would still obviously control or feel we had a right to en-

force our contract with that station where we had a contract, even though it was not made for broadcast there, simply because the provisions of those contracts, as in the case of RKO, do include provisions, by reference, to the syndication of programs." (Groot deposition, p. 70.)

Plaintiffs correctly point out that only evidence, as distinguished from pleadings or statements, serves to raise issues of fact on a motion for summary judgment. Issues of fact may not be brought into existence *ipse dixit.*

The affidavit of William A. Rusher, Vice President of National Review, Inc., sworn to November 5, 1972, clearly shows, without contradiction, that in November, 1970, after a lengthy period of dissatisfaction with Aftra's membership requirement, Buckley contemplated withdrawing from the union or bring legal action to determine his rights to do so. Rusher then requested Mr. Warren Steibel, associated with National Review, Inc. as the producer of Firing Line, to arrange a conference with the appropriate official of Aftra.

On November 25, 1970, Rusher and Steibel had a 10 to 15 minute meeting with Irving Lewis of Aftra at the union's office in New York City. If Buckley resigned, Lewis there asserted, Aftra would instruct WOR-TV to cease broadcasting Firing Line since Aftra had a contract with WOR-TV wherein the station was forbidden to broadcast work of non-members. Lewis explained that Aftra had similar contracts with every other television station in New York, and that Firing Line could not be broadcast in New York at all should Buckley resign from the union.

Lewis was uncertain as to the consequences of possible production in England. However, as noted by Rusher,

Lewis "said that he was quite confident that it could not be produced anywhere in the United States if Mr. Buckley were not a member of Aftra, and that Aftra would do its best to prevent the broadcast here of any programs produced in England." Lewis, in response to a question regarding Los Angeles as well, replied that Aftra had contracts with all Los Angeles stations corresponding to its contracts with New York stations.

Lewis noted that Buckley could not limit his Aftra obligations to paying dues and initiation fees. Buckley would also be required to respect an order not to cross a picket line around WOR-TV, and to participate in a nationwide strike of Aftra, if need be. If Buckley were to withdraw from Aftra, Lewis replied that the union would instruct its members not to participate in the production of Buckley's program.

Incontrovertable evidence, including admissions of defendant, shows that Buckley was required by the Aftra Code and contracts with broadcasters ancillary thereto, to become and remain a member of Aftra, against his will. It was made perfectly clear to him that he would be unable to continue to broadcast his opinions and philosophy should he fail to so do. He made a determined effort to elude Aftra, or at least to force Aftra to establish its coercive position as to him, in maner clear enough to permit tendering the issue to this Court and to the public.

Whether the actual transactions between Aftra representatives and broadcasters on the one hand and Buckley on the other leading to his membership involve peripheral issues of controverted fact is immaterial. Buckley and Evans have clearly shown on the record before me that they were forced to apply for and receive membership in Aftra in order to speak on radio and television with re-

spect to their opinions and philosophies. They need not show "threats", or "coercion" in a physical sense.

Jurisdiction

Plaintiffs assert their claim *inter alia*, under the relevant portions of the First Amendment and the Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

> The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. . . ."
>
> The Ninth Amendment states: "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."

Plaintiffs found jurisdiction on several grounds They urge that these are "civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000.00 . . .and arise[s] under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The cause of action, which states a claim under federal law, literally arises under the Constitution, and a substantial right of the plaintiffs may be defeated by one construction of the Constitution or a federal statute, as opposed to another construction. *Gully* v. *First National Bank*, 299 U.S. 109 (1936); *Wheeldin* v. *Wheeler*, 373 U.S. 647 (1962); *Oldland* v. *Gray*, 179 F.2d 408 (10th Cir. 1950), *cert den.* 339 U.S. 948. The circumstances do appear clearly from well pleaded allegations in plaintiffs' complaints.

We have no doubt that the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000.00 for jurisdictional purposes. That which is at stake here, the right to continue to offer for sale one's services as a commentator and analyst, is, based on the past financial performance of each

plaintiff, of the value of $10,000.00. Plaintiffs have every expectation of continuing in their professional efforts so long as there is a public demand for their services. This could be of indefinite duration. The mere fact that in a single calendar year one or both of them may have failed to earn $10,000.00 from radio and television activity does not preclude our finding that the right at stake is of such value.

Jurisdiction is also based on § 1337 of U.S.C., Title 28, as a case arising under an Act of Congress relating to commerce (National Labor Relations Act). While the plaintiffs do not assert any right given them under an act of Congress, they seek to test the extent of the rights given defendant under such an act, and asserted against them, in claimed derogation of their constitutional rights. Subject matter jurisdiction has been taken in cases involving disputes as to the extent of union power granted under the National Labor Relations Act, *Ford Motor Co.* v. *Huffman*, 345 U.S. 330 (1952); *Linscott* v. *Millers Falls Co.*, 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1971); *Seay* v. *McDonnell-Douglas Corp.*, 427 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1970).

Persons adversely affected by the results of collective bargaining agreements, which impinge upon their rights secured by the Constitution, have been permitted to seek relief in the District Courts. *Steele* v. *L & N Ry. Co.*, 323 U.S. 192 (1942). They need not exhaust administrative or intra-union remedies. See *Seay* v. *McDonnell-Douglas Corp., supra; Steele* v. *L & N Ry. Co., supra* and *Railway Employees Department* v. *Hanson*, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).

As so well stated by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson in *Communications Association* v. *Douds*, 339 U.S. 382, 401 (1950) ". . . when authority derives in part from Government's thumb on the scales, the exercise of that power by private

persons becomes closely akin, in some respects, to its exercise by Government itself", and therefore justiciable.

Defendant alleges in its answer (¶29) to the amended and supplemental complaint in the Buckley case, that it is "empowered to enter into [such] agreements with employers requi: ng as a condition of employment membership therein . . . pursuant to the provisions of §8(a)(3) of the N.L.R.A., as amended, 29 U.S.C. §158."

Presumably, if CBS News had failed to insist that Evans join the union, the union could have called a strike, notwithstanding the outstanding labor contract, or could have instituted suit, or filed an unfair labor practice charge [with the National Labor Relations Board] for failure to perform the bargaining agreement. If union leadership failed to enforce performance of the agreement by management, an aggrieved member of the rank and file may have standing to insist on such performance. 29 U.S.C. §151, *et seq.* Furthermore, NET is directly subsidized with federal funds.

Subject matter jurisdiction will permit declaring the rights or legal relations of the parties seeking such declaration, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2201, if, on the facts, an actual controversy is shown to exist. There is here such an actual controversy. Plaintiffs need not subject themselves to the loss of their valuable contract rights by withdrawing from Aftra, and as a result have their expression of opinion on radio and television stifled. Aftra has made clear that this will result if they do so, and plaintiffs have made clear that they joined only out of necessity, which they style as coercion.

The Court finds jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties for the purpose of determining the controversy and declaring the respective rights of the parties.

Defendant casts its attack on the merits of plaintiffs' claim that their First Amendment rights have been "chilled", in terms of an objection to jurisdiction because, it is said, no actual controversy exists. Of course, plaintiffs cannot litigate a philosophical question without showing a stake in the issue. They may not seek "an advisory opinion". The presence of an actual impingement, a threat to, or a chilling effect on their First Amendment rights of free expression must exist as a jurisdictional element of the case. See *Abbott Laboratoreies* v. *Gardner*, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); *International Longshormens & Warehousemens Union Local No. 37* v. *Boyd*, 347 U.S. 222 (1954); *Public Service Commission of Utah* v. *Wycoff*, 344 U.S. 237 (1952); *Eccles* v. *Peoples Bank of Lakewood Village*, 333 U.S. 426 (1948); and *United Public Workers of America (C.I.O.)* v. *Mitchell*, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).

Such chilling effect does exist here. See *infra*, p. 49.

Plaintiffs' Standing to Raise the Constitutional Issue

Radio and television stations are, in some but not all respects, a technological extension of the "press", as it was known to the authors of the First Amendment. This is recognized by most Courts. The First Amendment extends, of course, to broadcasting, as well as to other media of expression. See, for example, *National Broadcasting Co.* v. *United States*, 47 F.Supp. 940 (1942), *aff'd.* 319 U.S. 190 (1943).

Were the instant issues raised with respect to the press, however, distinctions would appear. The newspapers belong to their owners, and print what the owners will. In editorial comment, the New York Times and the Washington Post may be unreservedly liberal, while the Indianapolis News or the Manchester Union Leader may be unremittingly conservative. We are told that union

leadership as not, in the area of the American press, asserted the same control over columnists, editorial writers, commentators and analysts of opinion, such as Buckley and Evans, as is present in this case. Recently, the American Newspaper Guild voted to endorse a national political candidate. The New York Times editorial (Saturday, July 22, 1972) in part as follows:

> "... the decision of the American Newspaper Guild's Executive Board to endorse the candidacy of ... is wrong in principle and mistaken in tactics. The Guild clearly includes members of diverse political viewpoints. The union leadership cannot and should not try to speak for them as if they were a political bloc. Moreover, impartiality and fairness in reporting and editing the news are the central ideals of the news profession, never perfectly attained, but strived for every day. While it is true that the large part of the Guild's membership has nothing to do with preparing, reporting or editing, the union contains enough strictly professional journalists to warrant its avoidance of taking positions on public issues or political personalities. To do otherwise is to cast a shadow of doubt upon the profession's commitment to its own ideals."

Officials of many unions affiliated with AFL-CIO, as is defendant, cause their organizations to take political positions with respect to the endorsement of candidates and with respect to national and state issues. Section 610 of Title 18, U.S.C., as amended by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, expressly authorizes labor organizations to solicit and expend money in connection with a federal election, so long as not secured by physical force, job discrimination, financial reprisals or the threat thereof. In addition, the contributions or expenditures must be

from voluntarily financed segregated union funds. See *Pipefitters Local Union No. 562, et al.*, v. *United States*, 407 U.S. 385 (1972).

A political philosopher holding himself out to the public as presenting views with sincerity, must of necessity, have the importance attached to his views nullified if it be known that he is a member of an organization which is raising money for contrary positions, and taking adverse stands.

Radio and television differ from the press in that the press is open, at least in theory, to all. Any citizen (if he has Five Million Dollars) is legally free to start a competing newspaper in any of our major cities to set forth his own opinion. A latter day Paine with a mimeograph machine is deemed to have access to the "marketplace of ideas" for Constitutional purposes, equal to those who own and control the leading journals of news and opinion. Accordingly, there is no legal requirement for the press to present a "fair" balance of opinion and analysis. Subject only to the laws of libel, there is not even a requirement of truthfulness and accuracy.

The situation is different with respect to radio and television. Frequencies available are limited. Accordingly, access is limited. Licenses issued pursuant to the authority of Congress are in the nature of franchises, allocating the airwaves among those desiring to be heard and seen. Although acquired practically without cost, many licenses have been "sold" for substantial sums. Broadcasting franchises are held in the public interest.

The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") may not grant or renew a station license, except upon a finding that "public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served thereby" (47 U.S.C. § 307(a), *et seq.*). One

of the essential elements for consideration in determining public necessity is the "quality and *fairness* of the licensee's programming." *Hale* v. *F.C.C.*, 425 F.2d 556 (D.C.Cir. 1970).

As stated in *Red Lion Broadcasting Co.* v. *F.C.C.*, 395 U.S. 367, 369 (1969):

> "The Federal Communications Commission has for many years imposed on radio and television broadcasters the requirement that discussion of public issues be presented on broadcast stations, and that each side of those issues must be given fair coverage. This is known as the fairness doctrine, which originated very early in the history of broadcasting and has maintained its present outlines for some time."

Red Lion, supra, holds (p. 375) that the Fairness Doctrine "[E]nhance[s] rather than abridge[s] the freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment", and is constitutional. Also, (p. 377-8):

> "There is a twofold duty laid down by the FCC's decisions and described by the 1949 Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). The broadcaster must give adequate coverage to public issues, *United Broadcasting Co.*, 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945), and coverage must be fair in that it accurately reflects the opposing views. *New Broadcasting Co.*, 6 P & F Radio Reg. 258 (1950). This must be done at the broadcaster's own expense if sponsorship is unavaliable. *Cullman Broadcasting Co.*, 25 P & F Radio Reg. 895 (1963). Moreover, the duty must be met by programming obtained at the licensee's own initiative if available from no other source. *John J. Dempsey*, 6 P &

> F Radio Reg. 615 (1950); see *Metropolitan Broadcasting Corp.*, 19 P & F Radio Reg. 602 (1960); *The Evening News Assn.*, 6 P & F Radio Reg. 283 (1950). The Federal Radio Commission had imposed these two basic duties on broadcasters since the outset, *Great Lakes Broadcasting Co.*, 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32 (1929), rev'd on other grounds, 59 App.D.C. 197, 37 F.2d 993, cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930); . . ."

As stated in *Radio Television News Directors Ass'n* v. *United States*, 400 F.2d 1002, 1005 (7th Cir. 1969), *rev'd. on other grounds*, 395 U.S. 367:

> "The Fairness Doctrine was initially articulated in the Report of the Commission in the Matter of Editorialization by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). In that report, the Commission stated the basic obligation of licensees to present broadcasts concerning public issues, in a manner which would insure that the listening public would be exposed to a broad spectrum of views on a given issue. The Commission indicated that 'specific Congressional approval' of the Fairness Doctrine was contained in the 1959 Amendments to section 315 of the Communications Act."

Section 315 of 47 U.S.C. referred to in *Radio Television News Directors Ass'n, supra*, reads as follows:

> "(a) If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station: *Provided*, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the

provisions of this section. No obligation is imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate. Appearance by a legally qualified candidate on any—

(1) bona fide news cast,

(2) bona fide news interview,

(3) bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the candidate is incidental to the presentation of the subject or subjects covered by the news documentary), or

(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including but not limited to political conventions and activities incidental thereto),

shall not be deemed to be use of a broadcasting station within the meaning of this subsection. *Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in connection with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them under this chapter to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance.*"

Power to promulgate "such rules and regulations and conditions . . . as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter" is conferred on the F.C.C. by 47 U.S.C. §§303 and 303(r).

The statutory standard, public convenience, interest and necessity, is "a supple instrument for the exercise of discretion by the expert body which Congress has charged to carry out its legislation policy", and "to maintain . . .

a grip on the dynamic aspects of radio transmission." "Congress moved under the spur of a widespread fear that in the absence of governmental control the publ'c interest might be subordinated to monopolistic domination in the broadcasting field." [*Frankfurter*, J., in *F.C.C.* v. *Pottsville Broadcasting Co.*, 309 U.S. 134, 137-8 (1940).] See also *Red Lion, supra; National Broadcasting Co., Inc.* v. *United States*, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); *United States* v. *Storer Broadcasting Co.*, 351 U.S. 192 (1956); *Harbenito Broadcasting Co.* v. *F.C.C.*, 218 F.2d 28 (D.C. 1954); *McIntire* v. *Wm. Penn Broadcasting Co. of Pa.*, 151 F.2d 597 (1945), *cert. den.* 327 U.S. 779 (1946); *Greater Boston Television Corp.* v. *F.C.C.*, 444 F.2d 841 (1970); *F.R.C.* v. *Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co.*, 289 U.S. 266 (1933).

The aforementioned Congressional policies exist primarily for the benefit of the public, or listeners and viewers, but also benefit members of that class of persons available to be hired by broadcasters. There are a limited number of persons in the country situated as are plaintiffs, qualified by education and dogma to be hired to discharge this public duty of fair and balanced presentation of competing viewpoints. Plaintiffs have been so hired. While broadcasters would have standing to claim freedom from any union interference with the discharge of the fairness duty imposed upon them by law, they, in 1967, after a strike, bargained away this right with Aftra, presumably for economic value received, or labor peace equivalent to economic benefit.

We think that Evans and Buckley are so specially situated as to have standing also to assert for themselves, and for the general public, the rights assured by Congress to hear broadcasts of commentary, analysis and political opinion from diverse philosophic viewpoints.

If any system develops pursuant to Congressional authority which chills the First Amendment rights of commentators, the entire public suffers, but those who seek employment as commentators and who are qualified therefor and will not be hired, or will be discharged if they do not submit, have a special personal and economic interest, and state a grievance which we hold is cognizable in this Court.

That which for convenience we call Gilbert's Rule applies here:

> I often think it's comical
> How Nature always does contrive
> That ev'ry boy and ev'ry gal
> That's born into the world alive
> Is either a little liberal
> Or else a little conservative.[9]

A liberal cannot be hired to express news commentary or analysis from a conservative viewpoint, no more than a fundamentalist preacher can be hired to conduct voodoo rites, because such beliefs are highly personal, intrinsic and developed in the entire course of a man's education and his life. Plaintiffs, and many liberal and conservative commentators are sincerely devoted to the creed they preach. while defendant, with pardonable glee, has cited a column written by plaintiff Buckley, (New York Post, April 25, 1972) taking in another context an unduly restricted view of First Amendment rights, many conservatives are more liberal in respect to rights secured by the First and Ninth Amendements, than are the liberals, particularly if the exercise of such rights does not involve mass demonstrations or civil commotion. See *e.g.* the determined and un-

9. Sir William S. Gilbert, *Iolanthe*, (1882) Act II—Pvt. Willis.

successful effort of another conservative commentator to vindicate his First and Ninth Amendment rights against the demands of the Census Bureau, *United States* v. *Rickenbacker*, 309 F.2d 462 (2d Cir.), *cert. den.* 371 U.S. 962 (1963).

Once hired as a commentator and presented to the public as one who speaks his own sincere opinions and analysis from his own viewpoint or bias, we hold a commentator has First Amendment rights. The employers have recognized this, as appears from the substantial autonomy granted Evans by his contract with CBS News.

To discharge the network's statutory duties, *supra*, CBS News has developed the program known as "Spectrum" upon which Evans appears. We are told that by this format two liberals, two conservatives and two "moderates" speak on topics of their choice, presented in sequential spots with a disclaimer by the broadcaster which attributes the opinion to the speaker, not (necessarily) the station.

While it may not be held that union membership in all circumstances chills First Amendment rights and freedom of expression, we find ample evidence in this present record, of uncontested facts which show an actual chilling of plaintiffs' freedom of expression. The commentator or analyst, hired to express his own opinion has been grouped, in the labor contract, with persons described as "artists" or "talent" who are primarily entertainers, whose expression is guided, at least in part, by a script or scenario. While the union has no hiring hall or seniority list and its membership is open to all who can gain employment on television or radio, joining defendant does require acceptance of a serious and substantial union discipline. The degree and extent of such union discipline is clearly expressed by those provisions which have been discussed supra, at pages 15 and 16.

Defendant's officials have admitted on deposition that they would require a member such as Buckley or Evans to refuse to broadcast his commentary and opinion in the event of a job action, or in relationship to any producer or broadcaster who has committed an "unfair practice" insofar as concerns the union and in the opinion of the union leadership.

The chilling effect of this is very real; suppose a strike is called, at a time when matters of great public interest are occurring in the nation or in the world, as to which plaintiffs, missionaries of their conservative doctrine, desire to express their opinion and analysis, but they are required to refrain from crossing the picket line of another union or are otherwise forbidden from speaking, on pain of forfeiture?

By Congressional action, these plaintiffs have been required to agree in advance that they would so conduct themselves in a time of crisis. There may be some in this world of uncommitted people, Benthamites, pragmatists and cynics who will sign the membership obligations, pay the dues and hope that they will never be required at some future time to face the issue squarely. To the extent that such persons act with a secret evasion of mind, to sign, pay, and do as they please in the event of a strike, such is not to be required of a philosopher, liberal or conservative.

The Court believes that these plaintiffs, and others of liberal persuasion, might under circumstances be required by their principles to violate union discipline and broadcast their commentary and analysis in times of national crisis, even if to exercise their constitutional rights of such free expression of opinion, it were necessary to use the facilities of a proscribed employer, or to cross a picket line or to violate their obligations as union mem-

bers. It is inconsistent with First Amendment rights for Congress to force somebody to agree in advance to a limitation on such conduct, and this is what has occurred here. Nor is this issue speculative, or, as described by defendant, "sham, fanciful, frivolous, gauzy, theoretical and specious."

The issue contemplated has actually arisen in the recent past. The only national strike by Aftra against the networks occurred in March, 1967 because of a breakdown in collective bargaining negotiations for the 1966-69 Codes and contracts, pursuant to which for the first time commentators and analysts were expressly included within the bargaining unit.

During that strike, picket lines were established, and union members were directed not to report for work. The strike itself and the surrounding negotiations, including the fact that the bargaining was concerning itself with whether or not commentators and analysts were appropriate members of the bargaining unit, was in itself a proper subject for exercise of First Amendment rights. Plaintiffs were not then members of Aftra.

One Chester Huntley, then engaged as a liberal commentator by National Broadcasting Company, expressed his opinions in news broadcasts which he continued to make during the strike. He suggested that it was against the public interests for persons such as himself to be involved in organized labor and questioned the validity of the strike, objected to the arbitrary manner in which Aftra had gained jurisdiction over his work, and said that union wage demands by local news personnel, made to the radio and television stations, were unreasonable and would price local news out of the market.

After the strike was over, Aftra sponsored a panel discussion held at the Academy of Television Arts and Sciences

in New York on October 18, 1967. As appears from the December, 1967 issue of "Stand By!" at p. 12, marked as Pltf.'s Exhibit 24, in the deposition of Mr. Groot, Huntley again restated his opinion with respect to union contracts for commentators. Mr. Mel Brandt, then National President of Aftra and President of its New York Local, stated his position (p. 16) as follows:

> "It was a mistake not to have disciplined Mr. Huntley when he failed to honor Aftra's picket line last April. It may have been the biggest mistake that Aftra ever made in its history. It should never have happened. We were faced with a situation where Aftra had had its first national major strike. It was a new experience for Aftra. We had not served special notice on either the membership or the companies that there would be no waiver of the union's disciplinary rights. We hadn't even considered it. Let's go back to that time: We have a settlement after thirteen days of strike, with defections threatened—and we have a good settlement. It is a deal. We are faced with an alternative. We have asked people to honor our picket line. We have promised them protection. So the first thing we asked for was protection for those people who honored our picket lines. The companies turned around and said: 'Fine. We'll do that, but, in turn, the quid pro quo is that Mr. Huntley, and Mr. McGee and Mr. Scherer and Mr. Beatty must not be disciplined.' They mean it. So do we keep 18,000 members out two more months, three more months? It's an important issue. Do we fail to honor our commitment to protect those who honored our picket lines? We made a soul searching decision. Perhaps it was the wrong decision. In retrospect, I think it was wrong. We

> should have stayed out another two months if need be and we should have disciplined those members who did not honor our picket lines."'

The same Exhibit indicates (p. 14) thatt the union had levied fines of $48,000.00 against "five of itts newest members, with 90 more so I hear to come" (Hurntley, as quoted in "Stand By!", speaking at the forum poreviously mentioned).

The same issue also shows (pp. 9, 10) that 19 named persons had been fined a total of $129,775.000 for failing to comply with an Aftra National Board ordier to support a sister union known as "Nabet", and not to cross Nabet picket lines. However, there is no indicatiion that any of the persons so fined were commentators or analysts.

Chester Huntley's experience with Afftra is of sufficiently recent date and writ large for all tto see. He was saved from discipline only by pressure fromm the employers. The union President views waiver of disciipline as a mistake. Relatively certain knowledge that plaintiffs will meet the imposition of union discipline which Huntley missed narrowly, if they violate their wriitten agreement to abide by union discipline is of itself a chill equal to the chilling effects found by the Supreme Court in cases such as *Near* v. *Minnesota*, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)); *Thornhill* v. *Alabama*, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); *Murdock* vv. *Pennsylvania*, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); *Thomas* v. *Collins*, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); *Bantam Books, Inc.* v. *Sullivam*, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); *Lamont* v. *Postmaster General*,, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); *Organization For a Better Austiin* v. *Keefe*, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); and *New York Times Co.* vv. *United States*, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

Evans testified as to the chilling effect upon him. Besides the chilling effect to be drawn from aa literal reading

of the disciplinary provisions of Aftra's constitution, to which he had been required to sign his name signifying assent in order to gain employment, Evans testified on oral deposition that ". . . if Aftra goes on strike, I might cross the picket line. I think there is simply a generic implication that I conduct my broadcasting activity so as to be at the sufferance of Aftra." (p. 22). He testified further that "I have definitely felt inhibited by the requirement of Aftra membership . . . It was a question of membership to begin with, whether I should make an issue of this and resist joining Aftra at the time that it was required that I join, and I decided that I shouldn't because it might well abort my broadcasting career. The second obvious case is that I have felt inhibited by virtue of my Aftra membership from delving into the question of compulsory membership in Aftra, which had been a topic of controversy, and I have not done a Spectrum broadcast on that subject. I didn't want to jeopardize my membership and therefore jeopardize my broadcasting career."

Again: "I would say 'chilling effect' would be an appropriate description of my feeling with regard particularly to this issue. I am aware with (sic) Mr. Buckley's suit. I sympathize with the suit. At the time it came up I knew him, yet I didn't broadcast about it because I felt its chilling effect."

The circumstances surrounding Evans' situation are sufficient to warrant a conclusion that Evans was in fact chilled and inhibited.

In the case of Buckley, the actual restraint on his freedom of speech upon which he relies in this litigation is that he was required to join the union and to promise to abide by the constitution and regulations which he reasonably interprets as "that I am not allowed to say certain

things that I would be disposed to say because it might prejudice the welfare of the union." (Minutes, p. 63). He further testified "I have felt a chilling effect on my right to express myself in the light of the fact that the union exercises over me certain disciplinary powers which could result in fining me or taking me off the air, if I acted in such a way as to prejudice that union. That is my understanding of my obligations as a member of Aftra."

The fact that Buckley asserts that he did not "cave in" under the chilling effect, and that he is "defying" Aftra places him in no different position than that of Evans.

On the entire record before me, and in view of the prior experiences of Chester Huntley, I find that the chilling effect and the impairment of the freedom of expression of thought by Buckley and Evans as commentators and analysts of public affairs is real and substantial, rather than merely speculative, and is sufficient to present a justiciable controversy. In order to sustain what they assert to be their rights, it would not appear necessary for them to stop paying their dues to Aftra and be fired from their jobs. Instead, they may continue in good standing while seeking declaratory and equitable relief.

First Amendment Rights

Prior restraints on freedom on speech by federal, state or local government, or by those acting pursuant to Congressional authority, as is defendant, cannot be sustained in the absence of a competing and compelling necessity which, if not satisfied, will "surely result in direct, immediate and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people". *New York Times Co.* v. *United States*, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971). As further cases come before the Supreme Court, the trend progresses toward the simplistic

suggestion made by the late Justice Hugo L. Black during a famous interview, reported in The New York Times June 11, 1962. After noting the words of the First Amendment, Justice Black said:

> "I understand that it is rather old-fashioned and shows a slight naivete to say that 'no law' means no law, but what it says is, 'Congress shall make no law.' * * * [W]hen I get down to the really basic reason why I believe that 'no law' means no law . . . I took an obligation to support and defend the Constitution as I understand it. And being a rather backward country fellow, I understand it to mean what the words say. * * * It says 'no law,' and that is what I believe it means."

See also, Mr. Justice Black in *New York Times Co.* v. *United States, supra; Beauharnais* v. *Illinois*, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); *Yates* v. *United States*, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); and *New York Times Co.* v. *Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Prior restraints are presumed invalid, and the presumption is said to be heavy. *Organization For A Better Austin* v. *Keefe, supra.*

A prior restraint purely ministerial in nature was rejected in *Lamont* v. *Postmaster General, supra*, because considered "a limitation on the unfettered exercise of . . . First Amendment rights". Cases such as *Near* v. *Minnesota, supra*, which permit Congress to place restrictions on First Amendment expression must be founded upon a compelling interest which cannot be achieved in any other reasonable manner in lieu of the proposed restrictions. Cases limiting the police powers of states to chill First Amendment rights are equally applicable to Congressional action. *National Association for the Advancement of Colored People* v. *Button*, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). Some of

the most recent expressioins of the Supreme Court are found in *Baird* v. *State Bar of Arizona*, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); *Laird* v. *Tatum*, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); *Healy* v. *James*, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); and *Branzburg* v. *Hayes*, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).

The principles stated apply, among other things, to discussion of public affairs, the highest level of First Amendment rights. Restrictions placed on mere commercial activity, *e.g.* rules against commercial signboards or anti-littering cases, *Valentine* v. *Chrestensen*, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), are contrasted with *Thornhill* v. *Alabama*, *supra*, in which the Court analyzed freedom of speech and of the press as embracing the "liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment." This plaintiffs do not presently enjoy. See also *New York Times Co.* v. *Sullivan*, *supra* (". . . profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open"); *Garrison* v. *Louisiana*, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) at p. 74 ("specisal concern with public affairs is more than self expression; it is the essence of self-government"); see also *Rosenblum* v. *Metro-Media, Inc.*, 403 U.S. 29 (1971); *Nils* v. *Alabama*, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); *Bond* v. *Floyd*, 385 U.S. 116 (1966); *U.S.A.* v. *The National Committee For Impeachment*, ... F.2d .... (2d Cir. 1972), docket Nos. 72-1982, 72-1995, decided October 30, 1972.

Defendant cites cases such as *Linscott* v. *Millers Falls Co.*, 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), *cert. den.* 404 U.S. 872 (1971, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Douglas dissenting), which refused to sustain as a free exercise of religion under the First Amendment the claim of persons who were discharged because their religious principles forbade them to

pay union dues. What determination the Supreme Court will adopt on this issue in construing § 8(a)(3) as to those who claim religious immunity, when such a case reaches that Court, remains to be seen. In light of the subsequent holding in *Wisconsin* v. *Yoder*, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), it may sustain a free exercise claim. In *Wisconsin*, the Court stated at p. 215:

> "The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion. We can accept it as settled, therefore, that, however strong the State's interest in universal compulsory education, it is by no means absolute to the exclusion or subordination of all other interests. *E.g.*, *Sherbert* v. *Verner*, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); *McGowan* v. *Maryland*, 366 U.S. 420, 459 (1961) (separate opinion of Frankfurter, J.); *Prince* v. *Massachusetts*, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944)."

While free exercise of religion is of great concern to this Court, it hardly occupies the high standing at the bar of a claim for freedom of speech with respect to public affairs.

The foregoing discussion of freedom of speech must be taken to relate to those, and only those, who serve as analysts, commentators and those whose speech on radio and television contains in substantial portion expressions of their own philosophy, conclusions, opinions, bias and evaluation, applied in accordance with their own personal opinions and tenets, and presented as such. Defendant states, in part correctly, that:

> "Freedom of press and speech means expression not limited to the printed or spoken word. Ideas, im-

> pressions, analysis and commentary on public persons and affairs also are expressed in song, dance and pantomime, as comedy, satire, soap operas, plays, dramatizations, documentaries, even in commercials. . . . one picture often expresses more than a thousand words, whether on a newspaper page or on a television screen. Even a juggler's mute performance has been understood as commentary. Choreographers comment on public persons and affairs via dance steps which dancers perform without a word spoken. Instrumental music alone can be expressive. Silence, too, is understood as a form of expression." (Affidavit of Edward Schlesinger, Esq., p. 3, sworn to May 3, 1972.)

This argument misses an obvious distinction. To the juggler and comic we may add, by way of example, the impersonator who takes off the manners or diction of a public figure, in manner to disparage, and the newscaster reading from a prepared script, who expresses incredulity by inflection, or merely by moue. But those who do so, unlike plaintiffs, are primarily artists, actors and performers. They are not discharging a duty imposed by statute upon the broadcasters of furnishing a fair balance of opinion so that the public may hear that which it needs in order to act intelligently in the area of self-government.

As to those persons who are actors, artists and professional talent, the businesses in which they are engaged, or the services which they perform, are not intimately associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights. As to them, the undoubted need which Congress has found to exist for trade union protection may be sufficient to justify such prior restraint as may result. In essence, the juggler, the comic and the soap opera star are hired as actors; they

are not hired for the purpose of presenting an opinion to be passed off as their own sincere views.

Nowhere in the legislative history do we find any Congressional intent to use the statute as a means of stifling free expression of speech or of the press. The purpose for which the statute was enacted was to protect working men in the crafts and unskilled labor, to enable them to bargain collectively for such things as job security, adequate wages and fair working conditions. Congress concluded that under certain circumstances union shop conditions were necessary to achieve this end, although Congress permitted a state, if so advised, to provide otherwise (29 U.S.C. §158; 29 U.S.C. §164).

As to artists, actors and professional talent other than commentators, the union has a reasonable fear against the erosion of its role in the event that an artist or entertainer were permitted to "opt out" of the union on a claim of First Amendment rights.

The fact that in the past employers may have attempted to evade prior union contracts by passing off as commentators and analysts those who were not, does not justify the First Amendment restraint here found.

It is not necessary to declare Section 8(a)(3) unconstitutional on its face in order to effectuate plaintiffs' rights; rather we construe the section as not intending to provide any means whereby a union could place a direct threat of prior restraint upon a person so situated as are plaintiffs, as a combined result of (a) compulsory membership; (b) the need to subscribe to terms and conditions of union discipline; (c) the need to refrain from speaking through a broadcast outlet judged unfair, or not organized; (d) the need to refrain from crossing a picket line; and (e) the need

to heed any other union directions which would operate directly or indirectly as a prior restraint on freedom of speech.

Insofar as Evans is concerned, the record is clear that he has confined his broadcasting efforts solely to the area of commentator and analyst on news and public affairs, expressing his own opinion, philosophy and conservative bias. Buckley has done all that too, but he has suffered himself to be called a "TV Star", and possibly may have appeared on some program in the past, or may in the future choose to participate in some program, where the format may be such as to cast him in the role of a mere entertainer, without any substantial opportunity to express his personal opinions, analysis and comments as such. If so, he must join Aftra. We do not consider service as a moderator to be such performance, unless the moderator is restricted by the program format from expressing any personal philosophy or opinion. If a moderator is cast in the role of an impartial chairman at a meeting at which others than the chair have the sole right to exercise their First Amendment rights, then such a moderator could be required in our view to submit to Aftra's Code. The same applies to commentators on matters such as professional sports, meteorology, farm prices, fashions, market reports, etc., all of whom were traditionally covered by Aftra Codes prior to 1967.

The Free Rider

In its brief, defendant argued for the first time (p. 51) that plaintiffs were seeking to be "free riders" in attaining the benefits of Aftra's efforts as their collective bargaining agent, and that if they were not required to join or pay dues, and presumably, not required to subject themselves to union discipline, they at the very least, had to pay to the union an amount equal to the dues.

Defendant urged that paying such a toll to Aftra "is certainly no more violative of free speech than are the tolls imposed by federal, state and city governments cross a bridge over the River Platte, for admission to the bar, to do business as an employment agency or innumerable other professions, occupations or enterprises." (Brief, p. 51, *et seq.*)

Plaintiffs, in rejoinder, suggest correctly that the mere making of this argument does not constitute "a frank recognition of error and a permanent disclaimer of claims so long insisted upon." (Plaintiffs' reply brief, p. 20.)

The pleadings and the prior conduct of the parties clearly indicate that what is at issue, and what has been litigated, is the question of the requirement of membership and subjection to union discipline of a commentator or news analyst. More is involved in this controversy than mere payment of a modest dues bill, and the prior conduct of the union and the prior conduct of the employers required by the union agreement make it appropriate that these issues be resolved by declaratory judgment.

In this declaratory judgment action, in view of the prior conduct of the defendant, plaintiffs are entitled to relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations. They are entitled to have their legal relations clarified and to be freed from such uncertainty, insecurity and controversy.

The "free rider" argument, raised tentatively, and for the first time in the brief, does not moot the lawsuits. Defendant's dues appear reasonable. Cases holding that the worker's only obligation is to pay an amount equal to dues with no necessity of joining or submitting to union discipline are based on the theory that ". . . those who enjoy the fruits and the benefits of the unions should make

a *fair* contribution to the unions." *Railway Employees Department* v. *Hanson*, 351 U.S. 225, 231 (1956, quoting from Congressional debates); *Machinists* v. *Street*, 367 U.S. 740, 750-64 (1961); *NLRB* v. *General Motors Corp.*, 373 U.S. 734 (1963).

There is no evidence raising the factual issue contemplated by the "free rider" cases, that is whether these plaintiffs are in fact "free riders," or whether they do in fact enjoy any Aftra benefits. Apparently, these plaintiffs, by reason of union membership, are enrolled in defendant's pension plan. That is all. They each bargained for their own compensation, which is in excess of the union "scale" or minimum, and do not appear to have benefited in any other manner.

If there were any substantial "free rider" benefits, possibly a news commentator could be required to pay an amount not greater than union dues without seriously impinging his First Amendment rights, or chilling his freedom of expression.

Conclusion

Defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied. Plaintiffs' motion is granted, and a single judgment shall be settled on fifteen (15) days notice, or on waiver of notice, declaring the rights of plaintiffs as hereinbefore provided.

There is no need at this time to grant the permanent injunctive relief sought by the order to show cause, because there is no reason to believe defendant will not act in accordance with law, and honor plaintiffs' rights as declared by this Court. Such injunctive relief is denied, without prejudice to renew, and the judgment may reserve jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief on notice, should it be necessary.

Insofar as concerns the denial of injunctive relief, the foregoing constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court pursuant to Rule 52(a), F.R.Civ. P.

In the interests of justice, the status quo, and the relationships between the parties to this litigation, and between plaintiffs and broadcasters having contracts with Aftra should not be disrupted pending appellate review of the foregoing at the instance of any party. Accordingly, the judgment shall provide that it is in all respects stayed pending appeal. See New York CPLR § 5519(c) and § 2201, made applicable by Rule 62(d) and (f), F.R.Civ.P. No bond shall be required.

Dated: New York, New York
January 23, 1973

CHARLES L. BRIEANT, JR.
U. S. D. J.

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Supreme Court of the United States

October Term 1974

No. 74-314

FULTON LEWIS, III,

Petitioner,

v.

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

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September, 1974

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Supreme Court of the United States

October Term 1974

No.

FULTON LEWIS, III,

Petitioner,

—against—

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Fulton Lewis III ("petitioner") prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York entered herein.

Opinions Below

The opinion of the Special Term (QUINN, *J.*) is reported at 71 Misc. 2d 253 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1972), and appears in the appendix to this petition at page 19A.

The memorandum decision of the Appellate Division is reported at 41 A.D. 2d 707 (1973) (1st Dept. 1973), and appears in the appendix to this petition at page 18A.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals (STEVENS, *J.*) is reported at 34 N.Y. 2d 265 (1974); it appears in this petition at page 1A; the dissenting opinion of JASEN, *J.*, appears at page 13A.

Jurisdiction

The opinion of the Court of Appeals was entered on June 12, 1974. On August 12, 1974 Mr. Justice Marshall extended the time for the filing of this petition until Sep-

tember 28, 1974. (The extension had been sought so as to coordinate the filing of this petition with that in the related *Buckley* case, cf. *infra.*)

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3). 28 U.S.C. § 2403 may be applicable.

Questions Presented for Review

The questions presented for review are the same as those in the related case of *Buckley et al.* v. *American Federation of Television and Radio Artists* (hereinafter "the related *Buckley* case"). As it is intended that the petition in that case be filed immediately prior to the filing of the petition in this one, in the interests of brevity we do not repeat them here.

Relevant Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

The First Amendment, §§ 8(a)(3) and 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act and the Fairness Doctrine (47 U.S.C. § 315) are also relevant here. As these provisions are quoted in the petition in the related *Buckley* case we do not print them in this petition.

Statement of the Case

Facts

At pages 1A - 3A of the opinion of the Court of Appeals and page 19A of the opinion of the Special Term, the courts below correctly set forth most of the relevant facts.

Additionally, it is undisputed that petitioner is a commentator on public affairs with a program broadcast by the Mutual Broadcasting System over 350 stations (A.5, 6, 56).

As such petitioner comes under § 57 of the Radio Code of Fair Practice by which employer-broadcasting companies

undertake to see to it, as a condition of employment, that their "performers" join the union.

King, Mutual's Vice-President of Programs and News Operations, testified without contradiction that it was the "policy and practice of Mutual" to respect this obligation (A.5, 9).

Petitioner was forced by the union to discontinue broadcasting during an eight-day strike (A.9-10).

Petitioner testified the fear of union discipline under Article 18 of the Union's Constitution (quoted at page 6b of the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals in the *Buckley* case) had caused him to censor his broadcasts on matters relating to labor relations (A.50-53).

Like the petitioners in *Buckley*, petitioner personally negotiates his own employment contracts. By so doing he has won for himself compensation at the rate of $700 a week (A.57). Under the Code of Fair Practice his compensation would be only $168 a week (A.168).

Petitioner has no pension benefits.

The union does not purport to be "exclusive representatives" in bargaining. In fact the compensation provided by the Code only purports to be a "minimum" (A.64), thereby affirmatively inviting individual negotiations.

Thus, although claiming the rights of a union under § 8(a)(3), the union does not provide the consideration contemplated by § 9(a) and the free rider cases, i.e. negotiation of the terms of "pay, wages, hours of employment" for members of the collective bargaining unit as their "exclusive representatives."

The Complaint

The complaint, alleging these facts and that, as applied to him, § 8(a)(3), in so far as authorizing the union and the employer-broadcasting companies and the union to require him to be a member of the union, pay dues and obey its orders, as a condition of comment on public affairs was unconstitutional, and that § 57 of the Code was, as to him, illegal and unconstitutional and sought a declaratory judgment that, as to him, § 57 was void and of no effect.

Jurisdiction. As this suit was brought in a state court of general jurisdiction, it was, of course, unnecessary to set forth facts which would bring the case within any statute defining a limited jurisdiction.

The Decision of the Special Term

The Special Term first overruled the union's preliminary objections to jurisdiction, declaratory judgment, etc. (20A-22A).

The Special Term, on the merits, dismissed the compalint. It found that § 8(a)(3) was a valid exercise of power under the Commerce Clause, and that " 'membership' need be no more than paying dues" citing *National Labor Relations Board* v. *General Motors*, 371 U.S. 734, 741 (23A-24A).

The Decision of the Appellate Division

The Appellate Division modified the judgment of the Special Term to the extent of substituting, for that part of the judgment dismissing the complaint, a judgment declaring that § 8(a)(3) did not violate the First Amendment (18A). The Court wrote no opinion.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

The opinion of the Court of Appeals stated more elaborately the same reasoning as that of Special Term, viz., that the NLRA was a valid exercise of power under the Commerce Clause (4A-5A).

Whatever effect the strike may have had upon petitioner's speech, the law recognizes a right to picket, the Court noted. (6A-7A).

As for dues "the fact that plaintiff may elect to bargain for himself does not relieve AFTRA of its obligation, if requested to do so." (8A). "So long as plaintiff remains a member of AFTRA he is bound to pay dues or their equivalent by reason of the agreement, the union's constitution or its by-laws." (11A).

The Court found benefit for petitioner in the union's activities in that, "The salaries of others provide a standard by which the value of plaintiff's services can be measured." (12A).

The Court made no specific ruling with respect to petitioner's prayer that § 57 of the Code, in so far as requiring him to be a union member, be declared void and of no effect. The Court did say, however, that a union member might resign at any time, subject to the union's rules in that respect (10A-11A). The Court further noted that when petitioner "lawfuly severs his ties, he will be free of AFTRA's control." 11A. The Court continued: "Jurisdiction to determine an unfair labor practice, if plaintiff believes that is what is involved here, lies with the NLRB and not with this Court." The Court here cited the decision of the United States Court of Appeals in the related *Buckley* case, that decision having been announced a short time earlier. 11A.

The Dissenting Opinion of Jasen, *J.: A commentator on public affairs "whose First Amendment rights are of peculiar importance is so specially situated as to have standing to claim freedom from interference with his right to freely comment on public affairs."**

The dissenting opinion held that § 8(a)(3), "insofar as it authorizes a commentator on public affairs to be required to join a labor organization and comply with its orders, as a condition of speaking over radio, violates the First Amendment." (13A).

Considering *Radio Officers Union* v. *National Labor Relations Board*, 347 U.S. 17 (1947), *National Labor Relations Board* v. *General Motors*, 393 U.S. 734 (1963), *National Labor Relations Board* v. *Textile Workers*, 409 U.S. 213 (1972), and *Booster Lodge No. 405* v. *National Labor Relations Board*, 412 U.S. 84 (1973), the dissenting judges concluded that, whatever AFTRA may argue in this particular case, petitioner was required to be a member of the union and, as such, subject to its disciplinary sanctions (16A).

This result the dissenting judges found inconsistent with petitioner's rights under the First Amendment (16A). The dissenting judges said (16A):

> "The very essence of plaintiff's trade is the public discussion of matters of public interest or concern, an activity which has long held to be preeminent among the various First Amendment rights (citations). Such a commentator, whose First Amendment rights are of peculiar importance, is so specially situated as to have standing to claim freedom from interference with his right to freely comment on the news and public affairs."

* In which GABRIELLI, *J.* concurred.

Reasons for Granting the Writ

1. In conflict with applicable decisions of this Court, the New York Court of Appeals has upheld a law authorizing prior restraint of speech despite the absence of "clear support in public danger, actual or impending."*

We adopt the presentation in support of this proposition made in the petition in the related *Buckley* case, with this added comment:

The New York Court of Appeals seems more unaware, we submit, than the United States Court of Appeals that such considerations as "industrial peace and stability in labor relations" and "the flow of interstate commerce" do not control, as we see it, when legislation is challenged under the First Amendment as distinguished from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process clauses.

The Court reached this result although, (1) the union does not function as "exclusive representatives," (2) petitioner's "pay, wages, hours of employment" are governed by contracts negotiated by him, and (3) union membership has been, for petitioner, a nuisance, not a benefit.

We adopt the presentation made in the *Buckley* case in so far as the legal analysis is concerned, but not of course so much as relates to facts peculiar to Buckley and Evans. As regards this petitioner the allegations of the preceding paragraph apply as shown *supra* page 2. We additionally comment:

There being no evidence in the record that petitioner is enrolled in the pension plan or otherwise entitled to pen-

* *Thomas* v. *Collins*, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).

sion benefits (and he is not, in fact), the only benefit that the Court found as a result of the union's efforts was, as we have said, that "the salaries of others provide a standard by which the value of his services can be measured." *Supra* page 5. That the union negotiated for him a salary of $168 was hardly a help to petitioner in negotiating for himself a salary of $700. In fact it made petitioner's negotiations more difficult. Surely so nebulous a benefit (assuming that any in fact exists) is not a sufficient ground for denying petitioner what would otherwise be his constitutional rights.

2. In conflict with applicable decisions of this Court, the New York Court of Appeals has held that, by reason of the doctrine of pre-emption, the state courts of New York were without jurisdiction to declare that § 57 of the Code of Fair Practice (radio) was, in so far as requiring petitioner to be a member in good standing of the respondent union as a condition of comment on public affairs, "void and of no effect."

Whatever may be said as to dues, it has been abundantly settled since *Radio Officers Union* v. *National Labor Relations Board*, 347 U.S. 17 (1947), by a long series of cases in this Court and the Courts of Appeals, that a union may not compel membership. Cf. page 13 of petition in the related *Buckley* case.

The declaratory judgment procedure of the State of New York permits a declaratory judgment of petitioner's rights in this respect, as demonstrated by the dissenting opinion. 17A. The opinion of the Court did not dispute this proposition.

The Court indicated by its remark at page 11A that its failure to grant such a judgment was based upon the United States Court of Appeals decision in the related *Buckley* case holding that the doctrine of pre-emption applied under the circumstances.

The ruling of the New York Court of Appeals, being based upon that of the United States Court of Appeals is subject to the other comments made in the petition in the related *Buckley* case respecting pre-emption. For the reasons there stated the application of that doctrine here was in conflict with applicable decisions of this Court.

It is also to be noted that because the trial court here was a court of general jurisdiction, there can be no doubt that, apart from pre-emption, the court had jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

The Court should grant a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the New York Court of Appeals herein.

Respectfully submitted,

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September, 1974

STATE OF NEW YORK
COURT OF APPEALS

FULTON LEWIS, III,

Appellant,

vs.

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS,

Respondent.

Opinion of Court of Appeals

STEVENS, *J.*:

Plaintiff, a radio commentator on public affairs, states that he was required by his employer, Mutual Broadcasting System, Inc. (Mutual) to join defendant American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (AFTRA), pay dues, and comply with AFTRA's orders or directives as a condition of employment. Plaintiff asserts such requirement is purportedly authorized by Section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a) (3)). He seeks a declaratory judgment that such requirement, as a condition of speaking over radio, violates his rights under the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

AFTRA admits that it has a union shop contract with Mutual as exclusive bargaining agent for employees of Mutual in appropriate bargaining units and as exclusive bargaining representative for those employees in various other categories (one of which includes plaintiff, *viz.* broad-

casters); that it "is the designated selected or certified bargaining representative pursuant to the provisions of Section 9(a) of NLRA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158; admits that AFTRA is empowered to enter into agreements with employers requiring as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later, pursuant to the provisions of Section 8(a) (3) of NLRA, 29 U.S.C. Sec.158;".

After joinder of issue plaintiff moved for summary judgment and such motion was denied. AFTRA's cross-motion for summary judgment was granted and the complaint dismissed. The Appellate Division modified to strike the dismissal and to substitute therefore a provision declaring that Sec. 8(a) (3), insofar as it authorizes AFTRA to require plaintiff to pay dues as a condition to speaking on radio, does not violate the First Amendment. As so modified the order was otherwise affirmed.

Under AFTRA's Code of Fair Practice, and its agreements with Mutual, Mutual bound itself to "employ and maintain in our employment only such persons covered by this agreement as are members of the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists in good standing...." Such a provision is expressly permitted by the language of Sec. 8(a) (3), NLRA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158, entitled "Unfair labor practices". That section provides, in pertinent part,

> "(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—(3) by discrimination in regard to hire

> or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later, (i) if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in Section 159(a) of this title, . . . ;".

It is undisputed that AFTRA is the designated, exclusive representative in accordance with Section 9(a) NLRA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 159.

Plaintiff is and since 1966 has been a dues paying member of AFTRA and is under contract to Mutual. Plaintiff argues that since Section 8(a)(3) authorizes the union shop or union security provision heretofore quoted, it violates the First Amendment, particularly the provision that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. . . ." While plaintiff's contract with Mutual is a separate agreement, Mutual, respecting its obligations under the Code of Fair Practice, requires by such contract that plaintiff be a member of AFTRA. Plaintiff asserts that AFTRA requires that he remain a member in order to continue broadcasting with Mutual, that in 1967 he was required to interrupt his broadcasting by reason of a strike, and that he has felt intimidated by reason of AFTRA's disciplinary powers.

The question is do the provisions of Section 8(a)(3), by requiring plaintiff to pay AFTRA dues, unconstitutionally

act as a prior restraint on plaintiff's right of free speech? In our view it does not.

Article I, Section 8(3) of the United States Constitution provides "The Congress shall have power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States and with the Indian tribes;". The regulation of commerce involves not only traffic but commercial intercourse, and the power to regulate commerce is the power "to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed" (*Gibbons* v. *Ogden*, 9 Wheat 1, 196). This power, including the power to restrain or prohibit and to prescribe rules by which commerce is governed for the general welfare, is complete in itself so long as the specific limitations imposed, by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, are not violated (*United States* v. *Carolene Products Co.*, 304 U.S. 144). This power is also a protective power which enables Congress to adopt measures to foster, protect and control commerce, as well as to adopt measures to insure its safety. Acts which impede or burden the free flow of interstate commerce, including acts which grow out of labor disputes are within this protective power.

With the growth and development of this nation and its commerce it became obvious that industrial peace and stability in labor relations was essential. If such was ever to be achieved, there had to be some governmental guarantees of labor's right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. Continuing labor disputes, resulting in part in inequalities in the strength of bargaining power, led to abuses, favored contracts and even violence. Naturally, the flow of interstate commerce was seriously affected.

Section 7(a) of the ill-fated National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA) had produced certain real benefits

and encouraged labor to press forward. When the NIRA was held unconstitutional on May 27, 1935, it was succeeded, on July 5, 1935, by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). This act sought to promote industrial peace by encouraging organization and collective bargaining through representatives of labor's own choosing (NLRA Sec. 7, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 157). Majority representation was established as a desirable principle (NLRA Sec. 9, 29 U.S.C. Sec 159). The necessary result was some equalization of bargaining strength between labor unions and employers. As a safeguard against abuses by either, certain acts or conduct were defined as unfair labor practices (NLRA Sec. 8, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158). NLRA specifically forbids "any unfair labor practice affecting commerce." Its constitutionality has been upheld as a valid exercise of Congressional power in a case which dealt with manufactured products, (*National Labor Relations Board* v. *Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp.*, 301 U.S. 1), and later, one involving farm produce, *Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co.* v. *National Labor Relations Board*, 303 U.S. 453).

In the *Jones & Laughlin* case, *supra.*, p. 33, the Supreme Court spoke of the right of employees to self-organization and to representation of their own choosing, for "collective bargaining or other mutual protection without restraint or coercion by their employer", as a fundamental right on a par with the right of an employer "to organize its business and select its own officers and agents."

It is clear that AFTRA and Mutual acted within the scope of the law.

Plaintiff has a right to be protected in the exercise of his freedom of speech. However, plaintiff's contention that his right to free speech is affected is totally without merit. The power of Congress to regulate commerce is contained

in Article 1 of the Constitution. The guarantee of freedom of speech appears in the Constitution in the First Amendment, which expressly forbids Congress to make any law abridging the freedom of speech. This prohibition similarly affects the States by virtue of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (See N.Y. Const. Art. 1, § 8)

"The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and not to destroy . . . as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the act. Even to avoid a serious doubt the rule is the same." (*National Labor Relations Board* v. *Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., supra.*, p. 30).

Freedom of speech in its essence involves no previous restraint upon utterance or publication. It does not confer immunity, for abuse of the right will subject the offender to legal punishment. (See, *De Jonge* v. *Oregon*, 299 U.S. 353, 364). The tests for abuse have been referred to as "clear and present danger" (*Schenck* v. *United States*, 249 U.S. 47; see also *Stromberg* v. *California*, 283 U.S. 359), or the common law test of dangerous tendency, *Gitlow* v. *New York*, 268 U.S. 652 (Holmes and Brandeis, JJ. dissenting). The prevailing view at present is the "clear and present danger" test (*Terminiello* v. *Chicago*, 337 U.S. 1; *Thornhill* v. *Alabama*, 310 U.S. 88).

We look now to the record of what actually occurred with respect to plaintiff. In 1967, when a strike occurred he was requested to refrain from broadcasting. He did so. Apparently there was a picket line maintained by the union. The right to picket peacefully for a legal purpose as a means of communication and persuasion in labor disputes has been recognized and upheld as being valid (*Thornhill* v. *Alabama*, 310 U.S. 88; *Varlson* v. *California*, 310 U.S. 106).

However, even peaceful picketing "cannot dogmatically be equated with the constitutionally protected freedom of speech" (*International Brotherhood of Teamsters* v. *Hanke*, 339 U.S. 470, 474). The character, quality and circumstances of the act frequently determine its legality. "The effort in the cases has been to strike a balance between the constitutional protection of the element of communication in picketing and 'the power of the State to set the limits of permissible contest open to industrial combatans' ". (*Teamsters Union* v. *Hanke supra.*, p. 474). The request to refrain from broadcasting and, in effort, to respect the picket line, was not a request to do an illegal act, but a request to a member to aid in strengthening the union. He could have refused, as the record indicates others did, without retaliation. Admittedly, future strikes might result differently. The request to do a legal act would not wipe out the obligation to pay dues or to tender an equivalent sum.

There is nothing in the record which suggests, even remotely, that AFTRA attempts to censor plaintiff's broadcasts or that plaintiff is not free to express his views fully and freely, nor even that he is, or has been, punished or disciplined for the expression of such views. The contention of prior restraint must fall for it does not appear that plaintiff's fundamental right of free speech or liberty has been infringed.

There remains then the question of whether the requirement that plaintiff pay dues or tender an equivalent sum, in order to broadcast over Mutual, violates plaintiff's right of free speech or personal liberty. The statute permits a union security shop. Aside from that we look to determine if such a requirement is reasonable in rational experience.

Laws are made not for the individual but for the benefit and protection of the whole body. The rights of employees

were only secured through organization and protected by legislation and organization. Each employee must bear a fair share of the financial burden of union representation, with the union's obligation under the NLRA being to represent all employees of the class or craft it represents, regardless of union affiliation. (*International Association of Machinists* v. *Street*, 367 U.S. 740, 761-764).

"It is a principle of general application that the exercise of a granted power to act in behalf of others involves the assumption toward them of a duty to exercise the power in their interest and behalf, and that such a grant of power will not be deemed to dispense with all duty toward those for whom it is exercised unless so expressed" (*Steele* v. *Louisville & Northern Railroad Co.*, 323 U.S. 192, 202). The union has the obligation to act without hostile discrimination. "This does not mean that the statutory representative of a craft is barred from making contracts which may have unfavorable effects on some of the members of the craft represented. Variations in the terms of the contract based on differences relevant to the authorized purposes of the contract in conditions to which they are to be applied, such as differences in seriority, the type of work performed, the competence and skill with which it is performed, are within the scope of the bargaining representation of a craft, all of whose members are not identical in their interest or merit" (*Steele* v. *Louisville & Northern Railroad Co.*, *supra.*, p. 203).

The fact that plaintiff may elect to bargain for himself does not relieve AFTRA of its obligation, if requested to do so. If plaintiff be exempted from payment of dues no good reasons exists why other members, perhaps not so well known, should not also be granted exemption. In time this would mean the end of union organization and the

return to a species of jungle warfare which inevitably would impede and obstruct interstate commerce.

However, in *Machinists & Aerospace Workers* v. *NLRB*, 412 U.S. 84 (1973), the Supreme Court affirmed a judgment of the Court of Appeals (D.C. Cir.) sustaining the Board's finding of an unfair labor practice on the part of the union. In that case the action had a collective bargaining agreement with the Boeing Company. The day after expiration of the agreement, the union called a strike which lasted 18 days, and picketed one of Boeing's plants. One hundred forty-three union members crossed the picket line to work, 61 of whom resigned their membership prior to returning to work and 58 thereafter. All were fined by the union. There was no evidence that the union members either knew or had consented to any limitation on their right to resign. In fact, neither the constitution nor the by-laws of the union contained any provision expressly permitting or forbidding resignations. The Board ordered the union to cease and desist from seeking court enforcement of the fines as an unfair labor practice and the union appealed.

The Court left open "the question of the extent to which contractual restriction on a member's right to resign may be limited by the [National Labor Relations] Act." It applied the law "which normally is reflected in our free institutions—the right of the individual to join or to resign from associations, as he sees fit 'subject of course to any financial obligations due and owing' the group with which he was associated." (*Id.*, p. 88; see also, *NLRB* v. *Textile Workers*, 409 U.S. 213, 217).

In the instant case, there are agreements extant. Presumably, the members of AFTRA are aware of their rights and obligations thereunder. The dues and fees require-

ment of the agreement does not represent governmental action, but a contractual obligation. Resort by the union to the NLRB or to state or federal courts for enforcement of the requirement could conceivably involve governmental action (cf. *Driscoll* v. *International Union of Operating Engineers Local 139*, 484 F.2d 682 (7th Cir., 1973).

In *Hammond* v. *United Papermakers and Paperworkers Union*, 462 F.2d 174 (6th Cir., 1972), plaintiff, a Seventh Day Adventist, refused to join the union or pay the equivalent of dues and was discharged from his employment by reason of the union shop agreement. The court affirmed summary judgment dismissing the complaint, noting that Congress has authorized union shop clauses "as permissible, contractual provisions in a collective bargaining agreement between a union and management." (*Id.*, p. 175; see also *Linscott* v. *Millers Falls Co.*, 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir., 1971), *cert. den.* 404 U.S. 872).

The language used in *NLRB* v *Textile Workers, supra.*, where neither the union-management agreement nor the union's constitution or by-laws defined or limited the circumstances under which a member could resign, is significant. The finding by the NLRB of an unfair labor practice on the part of the union in coercing the employees, by the imposition of fines, in its exercise of rights guaranteed in section 7 of the NLRA, was affirmed. The Court said, "when a member lawfully resigns from the union, its power over him ends. . . . Under § 7 of the Act the employees have 'the right to refrain from any or all' concerted activities relating to collective bargaining or mutual aid and protection, as well as the right to join a union and participate in those concerted activities." (*Id.* pp. 215-216). The associational rights of individuals are protected under § 7 and restraint or coercion prohibited under § 8. How-

ever, § 8 does not impair "the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to acquisition or retention of membership therein." (29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)).

Where a collective bargaining agreement contains a union shop clause, which defines or limits the conditions under which a union member may resign, until the member takes action in accordance with such procedure, he is bound to pay dues or their equivalent. In the absence of an unwarranted abridgment of constitutional rights in a particular case, reasonable regulations should be favored. reasonable fees, reasonably adjusted to the needs and the circumstances should be approved. Every tax or every fee or even dues charged, will not, of necessity, constitute interference with a constitutional right (See, *Matter of Steinbeck* v. *Gerosa*, 4 NY 2d 302). So long as plaintiff remains a member of AFTRA he is bound to pay dues or their equivalent by reason of the agreement, the union's constitution or its by-laws. If and when he lawfully severs his ties, he will be free of AFTRA's control. Jurisdiction to determine an unfair labor practice, if plaintiff believes that is what is involved here, lies with the NLRB and not with this Court.*

Whether or not one be classified as a "member" is hardly determinative so long as union obligations are met. In the absence of a specific provision in the union constitution or by-laws, a union member may submit a voluntary resignation at any time (*NLRB* v. *Mechanical & Allied Production Workers, Local 444*, 427 F.2d 883 (1st Cir., 1970); *Communication Workers* v. *NLRB*, 215 F.2d 835, 838-839 (2nd Cir., 1954).

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* See *Evans* v. *American Federation of Television and Radio Artists*, ...F.2d ....., 42 LW 2597, [decision of U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, on April 29, 1974, reversing *Evans* v. *AFTRA*, 354 F. Supp. 823].

It has been held that a union can enforce, in a state court, a fine levied against a strikebreaking member where the union's constitution or by-laws contain a provision defining or limiting the circumstances under which a member could resign (*NLRB* v. *Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.*, 388 U.S. 175 (1967)). Such action neither violates §7 nor constitutes an unfair labor practice under §8(b) of the NLRA.

Nor is it unreasonable to require payment. "Union activity is by its very nature group activity, and is grounded on the notion that strength can be garnered from unity, solidarity and mutual commitment", *NLRB* v. *Textile Workers, supra.*, at p. 221, (dissenting opinion of Blackmun, J.). We pay tolls on highways, the licensee of a radio or television station undoubtedly pays a fee for the privilege, as does the sponsor of or advertiser on a program aired on television or radio. AFTRA's services entail expenses. Since such services are for the benefit of all it represents, all should share in the cost. The salaries of others provide a standard by which the value of plaintiff's services can be measured. Without them, and without organization, plaintiff as a single individual might well be powerless to command the salary presently received.

Freedom of speech and freedom of the press are fundamental rights. Denial of the right violates basic principles of liberty and justice and is not to be tolerated in a free society. The mere allegation of such denial does not establish the fact, and that is the weakness of plaintiff's position. I would agree with Judge Brieant "It is not necessary to declare Section 8(a)(3) unconstitutional on its face in order to effectuate plaintiff's rights" (*Evans* v. *American Federation of Television and Radio Artists*, 354 F. Supp. 823, 847, (U.S.D.C., S.D.N.Y., 1973)).*

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* Reversed by U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit on April 29, 1974 (.... F.2d ....), See 42 LW 2597.

The conclusion here reached, however, is that the requirement for payment of dues, and the union shop provision are not shown on this record to violate plaintiff's rights, nor does such payment amount to a tax upon his right of free speech, authorized by government by reason of Section 8(a) (3). The dues and union shop requirement do not become government action by reason of a protected right under federal law to organize and bargain collectively. (See *Driscoll* v. *International Union of Operation Engineers, Local 139, supra.*).

The rights and obligations under NLRA meet a social and economic need and such rights and duties are within the power of Congress to guarantee. The union shop provision in AFTRA's contract with Mutual might bar access of Mutual's channels to plaintiff if he ceased to pay dues or their equivalent to AFTRA. It would not limit his right to freely express his views, or to utilize other channels or avenues not so bound by agreement. Section 8(a) (3) also bars an employer from discriminating against a non-member of a union under stated conditions not here relevant.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed with costs.

JASEN, *J.* (dissenting):

I concur in so much of the court's opinion which holds that plaintiff, a radio commentator on public affairs, may be compelled to pay dues to AFTRA as a condition of his employment. However, I would hold that section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, insofar as it authorizes a commentator on public affairs to be required to join a labor organization and comply with its orders, as a condition of speaking over radio, violates the First Amendment.

The term "membership in a labor organization" in section 8(a) (3) has been interpreted narrowly to provide that

any person is a member of a union and thus satisfies the condition of employment under a union shop agreement if that person tenders the customary initiation fees and dues to the labor organization. (*Radio Officers* v. *Labor Board*, 347 U. S. 17; *NLRB* v. *General Motors*, 373 U. S. 734.) "'Membership' *as a condition of employment* is whittled down to its financial core." (*NLRB* v. *General Motors*, *supra*, at p. 742 [emphasis supplied].)

However, that is not to say that "membership" as a condition of employment is identical with "membership" as a description of the relationship between the labor organization and the employee. For example, in *NLRB* v. *General Motors* (*supra*), the United States Supreme Court discussed the difference between an agency shop and a union shop. The agency shop arises from a union security agreement between an employer and a union whereby "all employees are required as a condition of employment to pay dues to the union and pay the union's initiation fee, but they need not actually become union members." (*Id.*, at p. 736.) On the other hand, under a union shop agreement, "if the union chooses to extend membership even though the employee will meet only the minimum financial burden, and refuses to support or 'join' the union in any affirmative way, the employee may have to become a 'member' under a union shop contract, in the sense that the union may be able to place him on its rolls. The agency shop arrangement * * * removes that choice from the union and places the option of membership in the employee * * * *" (*Id.*, at p. 744.) Thus, where there is a union shop agreement, as here, the labor organization and not the employee has the "option of membership."

This being so, it is relevant to inquire whether there is a constitutional infirmity in section 8(a)(3) as applied to persons, such as commentators on public affairs, whose

First Amendment protection is of marked importance. Plaintiff contends that the element of union discipline as set forth in Article XVIII of the AFTRA Constitution[1] constitutes an unlawful and unreasonable prior restraint of his right to broadcast his commentary and analysis of the news. He argues that this provision authorizes the labor organization to discipline him for any "act, omission or conduct * * * prejudicial to the welfare of the Association." The chilling effect of this provision should be readily apparent. As a member of the labor organization, plaintiff is obligated to observe the orders issued by the organization. For example, in event of a strike, he would be ordered to refrain from crossing the picket line and thereby prevented from speaking on the radio as a commentator on public affairs. If he then chose to cross the picket line and violate his obligations as a union member, his conduct would undoubtedly be considered "prejudicial to the welfare of the Association", thereby subjecting him to disciplinary sanctions, including a fine.[2]

AFTRA argues that there is no real danger inherent in the power of the union to fine plaintiff for violating a strike order since the United States Supreme Court has held that

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1. "SECTION 1. Any member who shall be guilty of an act, omission, or conduct which in the opinion of the Board is prejudicial to the welfare of the Association, or of any of its Locals, or of any of its members, as such, or any member who shall fail to observe any of the requirements of the Constitution, or of any By-Laws, rules, regulations or orders lawfully issued by the Association, any Local or any duly authorized committee or agent of said Association or Local, or any member who shall in any way be indebted to the Association or any Local thereof, may, in the discretion of the Board, be either fined, censured, suspended or expelled from membership."

2. AFTRA concedes in its brief that "[a]n AFTRA member might * * * be subject to discipline enforced by fines * * * for such acts or omissions as crossing picket lines or failing to take part in a strike."

a union member may avoid such fines by resigning from the union before returning to work. (*Booster Lodge No. 405, Machinists & Aerospace Workers* v. *NLRB*, 412 U. S. 84; *NLRB* v. *Textile Workers*, 409 U. S. 213.) In both of these decisions, it should be observed, the court was careful to point out that there were no restrictions on the union members' right to resign from the union. (*Booster Lodge No. 405, Machinists & Aerospace Workers* v. *NLRB, supra*, at p. 88; *NLRB* v. *Textile Workers, supra*, at p. 216.) Indeed, the court implied that such a right to resign does not exist under a union shop agreement. (*NLRB* v. *Textile Workers, supra*, at p. 216, n. 4; at p. 219, n. 3; see also, *NLRB* v. *Mechanical & Allied Production Workers, Local 444*, 427 F 2d 883; *Communications Workers* v. *NLRB*, 215 F 2d 835, 838-839.) Hence, plaintiff, broadcasting under a union shop agreement, is required to be a member of AFTRA, and, as such, is subject to all of the disciplinary sanctions to which members may be subjected.

In my view, the relationship between plaintiff, as a commentator on public affairs, and defendant, as a labor organization, imposed upon plaintiff under authority of section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, is constitutionally infirm. The very essence of plaintiff's trade is the public discussion of matters of public interest or concern, an activity which has long been held to be preeminent among the various First Amendment rights. (*Rosenbloom* v. *Metromedia, Inc.*, 403 U. S. 29, 43-44; *Garrison* v. *Louisiana*, 379 U. S. 64, 74; *Thornhill* v. *Alabama*, 310 U. S. 88, 101-102.) Such a commentator, whose First Amendment rights are of peculiar importance, is so specially situated as to have standing to claim freedom from interference with his right to freely comment on the news and public affairs. The threat of disciplinary sanctions, as stated before, constitutes an unlawful and unreasonable

prior restraint of his right to broadcast his commentary and analysis of the news.

Nor may defendant successfully argue that the present action is not "ripe" for a declaratory judgment. Plaintiff has once refrained from broadcasting because of an AFTRA strike in 1967. The threat to plaintiff's First Amendment rights is as close as the next union-industry dispute. In a situation such as this, where there is an uncertain and disputed jural relationship, a declaratory judgment has the practical effect of quieting or stabilizing that relationship and is particularly appropriate. (See *James* v. *Alderton Dock Yard*, 256 N. Y. 298; *Somberg* v. *Somberg*, 263 N. Y. 1.) Plaintiff need not defy the union's demands and suffer the consequences in order to obtain an adjudication of his rights. It is the purpose of a declaratory judgment to obtain a determination of a controversy before obligations are repudiated and rights invaded. (*Post* v. *Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co.*, 227 App. Div. 156, affd. 254 N. Y. 541.) If plaintiff were to wait until he suffered actual interference with his right to free speech, any court proceeding could only result in prospective relief and would be too late to remedy the immediate harm he would suffer. In short, a declaratory judgment should be available where resort to ordinary actions would not afford adequate relief. (*Gaynor* v. *Rockefeller*, 15, N Y 2d 120, 132.)

Accordingly, I would declare that section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Law is constitutionally infirm, insofar as it authorizes a prior restraint upon a person such as the plaintiff, a commentator on public affairs.

* * *

Order affirmed, with costs. Opinion by Stevens, J. All concur except Jasen, J., who dissents in part and votes to modify in an opinion in which Gabrielli, J., concurs.

Memorandum Decision of Appellate Division

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

FULTON LEWIS, III,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

—against—

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS,

Defendant-Respondent.

C. D. WILLIAMS
E. SCHLESINGER

ORDER, Supreme Court, New York County (Quinn, *J.*), entered on September 8, 1972, denying motion of plaintiff for summary judgment and granting cross-motion of defendant for summary judgment, unanimously modified, on the law, to the extent of striking therefrom so much of that paragraph which dismisses the complaint and by substituting therefor a provision declaring that § 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, insofar as it authorizes defendant to require plaintiff to pay dues as a condition of speaking on radio, does not violate the First Amendment. As so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs and without disbursements.

We are not unaware of the succinct opinion of Brieant, *J.*, in Evans, Buckley v. American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, January 23, 1973.

Order filed.

Opinion of Special Term (Quinn, J.)

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

FULTON LEWIS, III,

Plaintiff,

v.

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS,

Defendant.

This is a motion by plaintiff for summary judgment. Defendant cross-moves for summary judgment in its favor.

Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, pursuant to CPLR 3212, seeks a judgment (1) declaring a: that plaintiff may continue to appear on radio irrespective of membership in the defendant American Federation of Television and Radio Artists ("AFTRA"), b: that section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, insofar as it authorizes or purports to authorize AFTRA's agreement with radio broadcasters which requires or purports to require that plaintiff be a member of AFTRA, pay dues, or comply with AFTRA's orders and regulations violates the First and Ninth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and (2) enjoining AFTRA from taking or threatening any action against plaintiff by reason of his withdrawal from AFTRA, failure to pay AFTRA's dues or comply with any AFTRA order.

Defendant's cross motion for summary judgment seeks to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that (a) the complaint fails to place a present justiciable controversy before the court, (b) because the complaint fails to state a cause of action or claim upon which relief can be granted, and (c) that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cause of action.

Opinion of Special Term (Quinn, J.)

Plaintiff is a news commentator and has his own radio shows over the Mutual Broadcasting System. Defendant has entered into an agreement with Mutual by which membership in AFTRA is required as a condition of employment by Mutual for broadcasting purposes. Under this agreement Mutual can maintain in employment only those persons who are members of the Union in good standing, or making application for membership within 30 days of employment and thereafter maintain membership in good standing as a condition of employment. It is the policy and practice of Mutual to comply with its "union shop" obligations to AFTRA. Thus, plaintiff has joined AFTRA.

Plaintiff alleges that he has been coerced by AFTRA to stay in the union at the risk of losing his employment. He also alleges that he had been intimidated by AFTRA into stopping broadcasting during an AFTRA strike in 1967. He alleges that he feared that if he did not "play ball" with the union he would be open to disciplinary action by the union and thus possibly lose his membership in the union and therefore his job. Plaintiff also alleges that fear of possible disciplinary action by the union has made him feel a certain intimidation as to expressing on the air certain of his views that are contrary to the interests of the union. In general, plaintiff contends the requirement of membership in the union violates his right of freedom of speech and is thus unconstitutional. Defendant disputes the factual allegations of any coercion or intimidation on its part.

The first question that must be dealt with is whether the court has jurisdiction to entertain this case.

> "The Supreme Court is a court of general jurisdiction, and it is competent to entertain all causes of action unless its jurisdiction has been specifically proscribed." (N.Y. Const., Art. VI)

Here, the complaint asserts that § 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, under the authority of which defendant has negotiated a contract with Mutual Broadcasting System, giving it the right to prevent plaintiff from appearing on Mutual's network unless he is a member of defendant union violates, to that extent the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Thus, there is a clear claim under the U.S. Constitution, and there is no doubt that state courts of general jurisdiction may entertain such claims.

The fact that plaintiff is continuing to pay his dues rather than possibly be put off the air does not mean that there is not a justiciable controversy for this court to hear. "An action for a declaratory judgment is the appropriate determination of a justiciable controversy where the plaintiff is in doubt as to his legal rights and wishes to avoid the hazard of taking action in advance of the determination of such rights. Bunis v. Conway, 17 A D 2d 207, 208. The remedy of an action for declaratory judgment is particularly appropriate for the determination of constitutional questions." (Bunis v. Conway, supra, 210.) If the remedy of declaratory judgement were not available, the constitutionality of the union shop would never be adjudicated as no public commentator would be willing to be put off the air for the period of time necessary to litigate the issue.

The arguments that the court lacks jurisdiction on theories of preemption or failure to exhaust remedies are without merit. This is not a case which is preempted by a federal board. The policy behind the preemption doctrine is not served by deferring to the Board where a constitutional question is validly presented. The Board's special expertise does not extend to the interpretation of

the Constitution. The field has been traditionally reserved to the courts. In addition, the plaintiff is clearly not bringing an action under the Federal Communications Act of 1934. Further, this is not a grievance against an employer under a collective bargaining agreement that he must first process under the procedures in the collective bargaining agreement. This rather, is a case asserting rights under the First Amendment in which the court has a clear right to take jurisdiction.

On the merits of the case there are two main issues to be decided. The first is whether the proviso of NLRB, section 8(a)(3) by requiring plaintiff to be a member of AFTRA and pay dues unconstitutionally acts as a prior restraint on free speech. The second question is whether the factual disputes as to coercion or intimidation by AFTRA are relevant to the above legal question, thus rendering summary judgment impossible.

It is clear that newscasters as well as all radio and T.V. performers are entitled to the protection of the First Amendment. Freedom of speech including expression not limited to the written or spoken word. However, it is clear that freedom of speech is not absolute. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).

The state has the power to regulate, despite what may be some incidental infringement, individual rights. The helpful means devised by the state to deal with "evils" has been weighed by the courts against any infringement on rights. Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217 (1967). Congress has exercised its constitutional power to regulate labor relations, enacting the Wagner Act of 1936, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, and the Landrum-

Griffin Act of 1959. Under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), Congress empowered the National Labor Relations Board to regulate labor relations. NLRA commands, as its purpose and policy, that the peaceful procedures of collective bargaining supersede the jungle warfare which caused industrial strife. Thus collective bargaining is a private undertaking by employer and labor organizations in the public interest. The case of National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1 (1937), affirmed the validity of the Wagner Act, and this has been the basis of all future labor regulations. The only source of revenue for the union is membership dues and initiation fees. The Supreme Court has made it clear that requiring a reasonable fee for membership by a "union shop" provision is not in itself a violation of constitutional rights. Railway Employees Department v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956); Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). The viability of unions is part and parcel of Congress's intention to promote industrial peace through collective bargaining. The beneficiaries of collective bargaining, being all the members of the laboring force, should contribute to the cause and not have a "free ride". Thus, Railway Employees Department v. Hanson, *supra*, decided that it was permissible for the legislature to require all who gain from collective bargaining to contribute to it. AFTRA has been explicitly and particularly selected by a majority of the employees in the same bargaining unit as plaintiff as their bargaining agent. Its services, consequently, are expressly solicited and wanted by these employees for the full, fair and faithful pursuit of the collective bargaining objects and purposes of these employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to all employees under the NLRA. Although the plaintiff derides the benefits accruing to him

by reason of the collective bargaining of AFTRA, whether he wants such benefits or not, AFTRA is obligated to provide such benefits to him as an employee in the bargaining unit under the doctrine of Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967):

> "Under this doctrine, the exclusive agent's statutory authority to represent all members of a designated unit includes a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination towards any, * * *."

The decision of National Labor Relations Board v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, makes clear that "membership" need be no more than paying dues.

> "If an employee in a union shop unit refuses to respect any union-imposed obligations other than the duty to pay dues and fees, and membership in the union is therefore denied or terminated, the condition of 'membership' for § 8(a)(3) purposes is nevertheless satisfied and the employee may not be discharged for nonmembership even though he is not a formal member. Of course, if the union chooses to extend membership even though the employee will meet only the minimum financial burden, and refuses to support or 'join' the union in any other affirmative way, the employee may have to become a 'member' under a union shop contract in a sense that the union may be able to place him on the rolls."

The right of access to radio and T.V. is not an absolute right open to all. It is secured to plaintiff by his employer as an incident to his employment. Plaintiff seems to be arguing that in requiring him to be a member of AFTRA

and pay dues, he is being denied free speech because if he fails to remain a member he will not have access to the radio network on which he gives his views. It may be true that by failing to pay dues plaintiff would not be allowed access to the radio programs he now has, but he would also be denied access if his program was cancelled by the network or if his program was preempted by what the network considered a more important show. There are many impediments to having access to air one's view on the radio and T.V. networks. If there were no impediments, such access would be an absolute right that all persons would have.

Thus, it is clear that the "union shop" requirement does not violate the constitutional rights of plaintiff.

The second question to be answered is whether the allegations of coercion and intimidation affect the legal issue discussed above.

Basically, the allegations contend that plaintiff was coerced and intimidated by being told and having knowledge that if he left or was forced out of the union he would not be able to continue broadcasting. However, the court has already made clear that denying the right to broadcast because he is not a member of the union, in the sense that he does not pay dues, is not a violation of his rights. Thus, even if the allegations were true and plaintiff was told that he could not broadcast if he did not remain a "member" of the union ("member" being interpreted by the *General Motors* case as paying dues), this was not coercion or intimidation. As long as plaintiff pays his dues employment cannot be impaired. *Labor Board* v. *General Motors*, supra. This is clear and there is no allegation of facts that in any way shows a violation of the above principle. There has

also been no allegation of union disciplinary action which has interfered with plaintiff's employment. Thus, the factual dispute between the parties does not bear on the legal issue involved and does not prevent the granting of summary judgment. There are not triable issues involved. The union shop agreement does not, as a matter of law, violate any of the plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in favor of defendant.

Settle order.

Dated: July 13th, 1972.

P. A. Q.
J. S. C.

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Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1974

No. 74-313

WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR., NATIONAL REVIEW and M. STANTON EVANS, *Petitioners,*

v.

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS, *Respondent.*

No. 74-314

FULTON LEWIS, III, *Petitioner,*

v.

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS, *Respondent.*

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR RESPONDENT

In the pending petitions three nationally known commentators attack the proviso to Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act which permits union-employer agreements requiring each employee to become a "member" of the union to the extent of paying periodic dues and initiation fees. That

financial support requirement permitted by the federal law is upheld below by three federal appeals judges in *Buckley,* and by all seven judges of the New York Court of Appeals in *Lewis.* Moreover, all ten judges in the two lower courts have correctly ruled that petitioners' subsidiary claim—that "misrepresentation" and "coercion" induced them to go beyond support to join and remain regular AFTRA members—presents only a Labor Board-preempted claim of NLRA violation.[1] We demonstrate herein that no new or substantial question is presented by these rulings below, but first pause to state the context of the controversy.

COUNTERSTATEMENT

Petitioners present several subsidiary grievances and challenges to the federal statute which may obscure the central thrust of their attack. For instance, petitioners object that when first employed by the media they were induced by misrepresentations to become regular AFTRA members rather than mere dues payers; but they have never sought to resign from the Union. Similarly, petitioners assert that because of their Union membership, in a possible future AFTRA strike they may fear to express on the air their personal strike opposition; but again they have not sought to avoid such a possible constraint by resigning their membership. Indeed petitioners have never even filed

[1] The only plea by petitioners which won any support below, from two dissenting New York judges, is that their First Amendment rights are violated because the federal labor law compels them to go beyond mere dues payments by becoming and remaining regular union members. As we emphasize hereafter, that reflects a complete misconception of the federal statute, contrary to its definitive construction by this Court as permitting no greater compulsion on Mr. Buckley and his fellow petitioners than the payment of pro-rata dues to their bargaining representative.

unfair labor practice charges against AFTRA. But beyond these secondary grievances there lies petitioners' more fundamental objection: as stated in the first of their "questions presented" (see *Buckley* Pet. p. 2), petitioners *"challenge their liability to pay dues because the union has not functioned as their 'exclusive representatives' as provided by § 9(a) and has conferred upon them minimal, if any, benefit."*

That contention caps petitioners' repeated refrain in these suits that they have negotiated higher than usual individual wage scales with their employers, as permitted to commentators by the Union contract, and "did not seek, and do not desire, to be represented by the union" (*Buckley* Pet. 12b). They assert that they should have to give no financial support at all to the Union, simply shrugging aside AFTRA's functions in maintaining the bargaining organization, providing grievance-arbitration representation, and achieving collective agreements. Those agreements stipulate rights which the employers cannot diminish or omit in individual contracts, and thus provide the foundation on which individual commentators may sometimes build additional benefits. The AFTRA collective bargaining agreements guarantee that producers will *"make no contract with any performer at terms less favorable"* than those collectively bargained (*Buckley* J. A. 313a). Among other provisions, the agreements give assurance against free replays and foreign uses (*id.* at 297a), establish access to arbitration (*id.* at 317a), and define safeguards with respect to pay television (*id.* at 316a). These are among benefits which even such potent bargainers as Mr. Buckley would not have been able to obtain on their own, and owe to bargaining by the Union even though they have subsequently suc-

ceeded in using the guarantee of "no contract . . . at terms less favorable" to get equivalent clauses in their individual contracts.

Petitioners' ultimate objection to dues payment because they "do not desire to be represented by the union" thus attacks the core of NLRA's collective bargaining principle. That attack was put to rest more than thirty years ago in such landmark decisions as *Labor Board* v. *Jones & Laughlin*, 301 U.S. 1, and *J. I. Case* v. *Labor Board*, 321 U.S. 332. To the claim that "an individual workman may sometimes have, or be capable of getting, better terms than those obtainable by the group", this Court answered in *J. I. Case* that it could not "except individual contracts generally from the operation of collective ones because some may be more individually advantageous. Individual contracts cannot subtract from collective ones . . ." (321 U.S. at 338, 339). Of course, it is hardly surprising that it is these petitioners who resurrect the attack on the principle of collective bargaining and the compulsory dues support based thereon; after all, the anti-union creed which petitioners publicly espouse in their broadcasts is one which continues to resist the Wagner Act's central premise. Moreover, it is money donated through "Right to Work" organizations by employers who share that creed which is financing these petitioners' suits.[2]

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[2] In a pending federal case it has been conceded by the chief officer of the National Right to Work Committee that the organization is at least 84% employer-financed (see deposition of Reed Larson, p. 316, and response #7(e) to plaintiffs' third interrogatories in *International Union* v. *National Right to Work*, Civ. A. 839-73, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia). In 1966 Buckley assigned his AFTRA insurance benefits to the Committee (*Buckley* J. A. 521a) and beginning in 1967 he repeatedly asked that organization to finance his proposed suit against AFTRA; ultimately such financing was undertaken to the extent

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In assessing petitioners' attack on their dues payment obligation and its underlying premise of shared responsibility for the costs of collective bargaining, it is noteworthy that in the years since this Court upheld the Wagner Act's "closed shop," federal union security law has moved far toward meeting interests of employee abstention from unionism. In a succession of Congressional amendments and clarifying rulings by this Court, the closed shop has been replaced by rules which balance fair union demands for sharing of costs by all those represented with the individual employee's option of abstention and dissent. These include (1) replacement of the "closed shop" by the "union shop" permitting no greater employment compulsion on workers than their payment of financial support to the bargaining representative; (2) the limitation of such required support by exclusion of union political-ideological expenditures unrelated to collective bargaining; and (3) recognition of Labor Board authority to prevent union interference with an employee's option to resign his union membership:

(i) In 1947 Congress abolished the "closed shop", by adopting the proviso to § 8(a)(3) which places strict limits on union security requirements. The balance struck permits an agreement with the union "to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the

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of the total costs of plaintiffs' attorney's fees in the *Buckley* and *Lewis* litigations, in an amount which now exceeds $100,000. (See deposition of Reed Larson, pp. 805-811, in Civ. A. 839-73, D.C. D.C.). The financial support is being furnished by the "National Right to Work Legal Defense and Education Foundation," created by the National Right to Work Committee in 1969 as its tax-exempt arm to finance anti-union suits throughout the nation.

beginning of such employment . . ." The section's second proviso further specifically stipulates that an employer may not impose sanctions for nonmembership in a labor organization whenever membership has been denied "*for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and initiation fees uniformly required . . .*" It was confirmed by this Court soon after this modification of NLRA that employment sanctions may be imposed only with respect to the failure to meet financial obligations. "Congress recognized the validity of unions' concern about 'free riders' . . . and gave unions the power to contract to meet that problem while withholding from unions the power to cause the discharge of employees for any other reason." *Radio Officers* v. *Labor Board,* 347 U.S. 17, 41.

As a corollary of that ruling, and based on the express language of the second proviso to § 8(a)(3), it was also soon established that thereunder the union and the company may agree to enforce by employment sanctions only the employee's financial support, not membership as such. *Labor Board* v. *General Motors,* 373 U.S. 734, 742; see also *Labor Board* v. *Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,* 388 U.S. 175, 184, n. 37, and *Scofield* v. *Labor Board,* 394 U.S. 423, 428. As this Court held in *General Motors* (pp. 742-743), in § 8(a)(3) " 'Membership' as a condition of employment is whittled down to its financial core," so that "if an employee in a union shop unit refuses to respect any union-imposed obligations other than the duty to pay dues and fees . . . the condition of 'membership' for § 8(a)(3) purposes is nevertheless satisfied and the employee may not be discharged for nonmembership even though he is not a formal member."

(ii) Not only has this Court made clear that compulsory union membership under federal labor law has been "whittled down to its financial core", but to assure conformity with the First Amendment it has also reduced that financial core by excluding political-ideological expenditures unrelated to collective bargaining. In *Railway Employees' Dept.* v. *Hanson*, 351 U.S. 225, this Court postponed resolution of a First Amendment challenge to union use of compulsory dues for politics, for the moment affirming only that compulsory financial support by all who are represented in collective bargaining under the Railway Labor Act is permissible. As the opinion stated it (at p. 238): "We . . . hold that the requirement for financial support of the collective-bargaining agency by all who receive the benefits of its work is within the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause and does not violate either the First or the Fifth Amendments." This Court thus made the collective bargaining principle of the statute the predicate for upholding the statute's provision allowing compulsory financial support "by all who receive the benefits" of union representation.

Machinists v. *Street*, 367 U.S. 740, further confirmed the underlying principle. It declined to approve compulsory financial support by employees to the union's expenditures in the area of politics—an area wherein the union is *not* the statutory representative of the worker and each employee maintains his individual options of support or abstention. There (at pp. 768-769) this Court reconciled the union shop clause of the Railway Labor Act with the First Amendment by construing it so as to "deny the unions, over an employee's objection, the power to use his exacted funds to

support political causes which he opposes." On the other hand, the Court emphasized (p. 771) that "the union-shop agreement itself is not unlawful," and found (p. 772) that the lower court's injunctive interference with union dues collection from all employees "defeats the congressional plan to have all employees benefited share costs 'in the realm of collective bargaining.'" In sum, federal labor law now permits no greater "union security" compulsion on employees than their payment of financial support to their collective bargaining representative for costs not including political-ideological expenditures unrelated to collective bargaining functions.[3]

(iii) Finally, this Court has also ruled that the Labor Board has authority to protect a member's option to resign against all forms of union coercion or restraint. In *Labor Board* v. *Granite State Joint Board*, 409 U.S. 213, 216, the Board was found empowered to protect an employee against union interference with the recognized "right of the individual to join or to resign from associations." In that respect the opinion below by the Second Circuit notes (*Buckley* Pet. 15b) that AFTRA "acknowledges that Buckley

[3] This Court's suggestion in *Railway Clerks* v. *Allen*, 373 U.S. 113, that unions create internal machinery by which dissenters can be provided dues rebates for union political expenditures has been adopted by three major national unions. The United Auto Workers adopted such a Constitutional procedure at their 1968 national convention. Similar action was undertaken on June 13, 1974 by the national convention of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees. Recently the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers did likewise. There is no reason to suppose that other unions will not follow suit if demands are voiced by dissenters for rebates of political expenditures. AFTRA, however, is a union which does not engage in political expenditures activities.

and Evans can avoid any other sanctions which the union might seek to impose on them by resigning from 'full-fledged membership while continuing to pay dues.'" Under this Court's rulings the Labor Board is available to afford petitioners redress should the Union dishonor its recognition that petitioners can resign and confine their obligations to the dues payments which constitute the outer limit of compulsory unionism under federal law.[4]

This Court's salient constructions of federal union security have struck a fair and workable balance between the need for sharing the costs of collective representation and the individual employee's option of

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[4] In the District Court the Union expressly recognized that "an employee cannot be compelled to become a member of the union, to obey any union regulations or to be subject to any union disciplinary proceedings." It did so in the affidavit of the National Executive Secretary of AFTRA (*Buckley* J. A. 224a) stating as follows:

> "AFTRA has not sought or threatened to impose any limitations on [plaintiffs] freedom to say or write anything which they wish. The National Labor Relations Act bars the union from imposing any such limitation and there is available a specific and effective legal remedy before the National Labor Relations Board if any effort by the union to impose such should be attempted. Under Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) of the Act and the decisions of NLRB and the courts in interpreting, applying and enforcing those provisions, an employee cannot be compelled to become a member of the union, to obey any union regulations or to be subject to any union disciplinary proceedings. The most that can be required of an employee under a union security provision agreed to by the employer is that the employee tender to the union an amount of money equal to regular dues and initiation fees."

The letter of May 1974 sent to Mr. Rusher of National Review, relied upon by petitioners (*Buckley* Pet. 13-14), nowhere negates their right to resign and confine themselves to dues payments and in any event came not from AFTRA but from an NBC executive.

abstention from unionism. Existing federal labor law represents a felicitous accommodation between the civil liberties of the individual worker and the collective needs of the labor organization. Even in the earlier era of the closed shop petitioners could not have prevailed in challenging their dues obligation and the collective bargaining system upon which it rests. But surely their attack is even less cogent at a time when compulsory unionism has been "whittled down to its financial core" and that core has itself been confined by exclusion of political-ideological costs unrelated to collective bargaining functions. Under these circumstances the courts below recognized that petitioners' financial support obligation rests on a firm footing in the necessities of collective bargaining. We proceed to demonstrate that their rulings present no substantial question for this Court's resolution.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRITS

1. No Substantial Question Is Presented by the Lower Courts' Conclusion that § 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act Is Consistent with the First Amendment in Permitting Compulsory Union Membership to the Extent of Pro-Rata Financial Support by Each Employee

In the first of their "questions presented" petitioners claim that their First Amendment rights are violated by "the authority of § 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act to compel the payment of dues by commentators on public affairs . . ." We submit, however, that the rulings by the Second Circuit and the Court of Appeals of New York that compulsory dues payment does not violate petitioner's First Amendment rights are eminently correct and present no new or substantial question for this Court's resolution.

Thus, it is the Second Circuit's cogent conclusion (*Buckley* Pet. 7b) that the dues payment requirement "does not abridge appellees' first amendment right of free speech," because, in permitting compulsory dues from all who are represented by the union, § 8(a)(3) serves a "substantial public interest" in preventing the "flagrant inequity" of free riders (*id.* 12b). That court also rejects (*id.* 12b-13b) petitioners' contention "that they did not seek, and do not desire, to be represented by the union and . . . have not derived any substantial benefits from the union's representation," finding no ground for "disinguishing between the degrees of benefit one enjoys as a result of a union's bargaining efforts on his behalf."[5] To like effect is the ruling below by the Court of Appeals of New York, which holds (*Lewis* Pet. 3A-4A) that the federal statute does not violate First Amendment rights in "requiring plaintiff to pay AFTRA dues." The Court relies for that conclusion on the *Street* holding that consistent with the Federal Constitution the RLA permits a contract under which "each employee must bear a fair share of the financial burden of union representation" (*id.* at 8A).

These rulings are correct applications of the principles announced by this Court as early as *Jones*

[5] The Second Circuit's ruling in that respect is fully confirmed by this Court's emphasis in *Maryland* v. *Wirtz*, 392 U.S. 183, 192-193, that Congress having the power to declare "that an entire class of activities affects commerce," the only question for the courts is whether the class as a whole is within the Congressional province. For "the contention that in Commerce Clause case. the courts have power to excise, as trivial, individual instances falling within a rationally defined class of activities has been put entirely to rest." In any event, it is manifest (see *supra* p. 3) that petitioners have indeed obtained substantial benefits from the collective agreements bargained by AFTRA.

& Laughlin and *J. I. Case,* and as recently as *Hanson* and *Street.* In rejecting petitioners' claim (see *Buckley* Pet. 12b) that "they did not seek, and do not desire, to be represented by the union," the courts below apply this Court's seminal rulings upholding the constitutionality of the Wagner Act and its collective bargaining system.[6]

Nor do petitioners gain any strength from their claim that although compulsory dues might properly be required in other industries, nevertheless the First Amendment immunizes them from such a requirement because petitioners are employed in the media as commentators. As Mr. Justice Powell has recently reminded, in First Amendment cases "it is important to identify with some care the nature of the alleged abridgement." *Pittsburgh Press Co.* v. *Human Relations Com'n.,* 413 U.S. 376, 382. Unlike *Pittsburgh Press,* here we are not even concerned with a statute that imposes any special duties on the press or in any way regulates its content; we have only the application of the collective bargaining system and its

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[6] The opinion by the two dissenting judges of the New York Court of Appeals finds a Constitutional infirmity because they believe that more than mere dues payment can be required under § 8(a)(3). They construe *General Motors* as a ruling that not mere dues payments but actual union membership can be compelled, so that in fact "the labor organization and not the employee has the 'option of membership'" (Lewis Pet. 14A). On that basis they find (*id.* 16A) that the First Amendment is violated because under the union shop agreement an employee of the media "is required to be a member of AFTRA, and, as such, is subject to all of the disciplinary sanctions to which members may be subjected." But the First Amendment issue which the dissenting judges perceive simply does not arise, for their construction of § 8(a)(3) is patently in conflict with this Court's repeated rulings confining its permissible scope to the financial realm. See *Radio Officers, General Motors, Allis-Chalmers, Scofield, Hanson, supra.*

dues payment obligation to employees of the media just as in every other industry. Petitioners' claim of special exemption was thus long ago answered in *Associated Press* v. *Labor Board*, 301 U.S. 103, 132-133. There John W. Davis argued that application of the National Labor Relations Act to newspapers violates the First Amendment because newspapers have an unconditional right to hire and fire whom they please. This Court answered (at 132) that "the publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws." The Court's upholding of the applicability of the NLRA has since been echoed in countless rulings applying other regulatory schemes to the media. See citations in *Pittsburgh Press, supra,* at 382-383. Like decisions to tax the media or to regulate their business aspects, application of the NLRA collective bargaining scheme and the dues support requirement flowing from that scheme does not in any way "disable the press by undermining its institutional viability" *(Pittsburgh Press, supra,* at 382). In sum, petitioners' First Amendment attack on the NLRA's union shop provision presents nothing new and raises no substantial question for this Court.[7]

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[7] While never really clarifying how the First Amendment is infringed, petitioners did indicate below that it is their full membership in the Union—which, however, they have never sought to resign—that may create First Amendment conflict. As Mr. Buckley stated it: "My interpretation of the [Union] constitution is that I am not allowed to say certain things that I would be disposed to say because it might prejudice the welfare of the union," and "the union exercises over me certain disciplinary powers which could result in fining me or taking me off the air if I acted in such a way as to prejudice that union" (*Buckley* J. A. 273a). Such fears are quite unfounded. As stated by AFTRA's National Executive Secretary in his affidavit supporting summary judgment, Buckley can limit his union obligation simply to the payment of

2. No Substantial Question is Presented by the Lower Courts' Conclusion that Any Coercion on Petitioners to Become or Remain Regular Union Members Rather Than Mere Dues-Payers is Exclusively Redressable by the Labor Board as a Violation of the National Labor Relations Act

In their second question presented petitioners challenge the conclusion of the courts below that the National Labor Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction over their subsidiary claim—the claim that "misrepresentation" and "coercion" induced them to become and to remain regular members of AFTRA subject to its rules and discipline. The courts below find that this allegation presents only a possible NLRA violation which is committed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Board. Applying the *Garmon* rule, the Second Circuit's opinion *(Buckley* Pet. 13b-17b) holds it the function of the Labor Board rather than the courts to redress any coercion or misrepresentation inducing petitioners to become or remain regular AFTRA members. The concurring opinion by Judge Friendly similarly concludes *(id.* 18b) that "to the extent that the appellees contend that the union would be committing an unfair labor practice by imposing fines or otherwise disciplining them, I agree that their claim is preempted." So too, as concerns petitioner Lewis the Court of Appeals of New York concludes

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union dues (*Buckley* J. A. 224a); moreover, he pointed out (*id.* at 225a) that:

> "The Supreme Court's position, with which AFTRA is in full accord, remains that unions should not be allowed to discipline members for exercise of their First Amendment rights. If at any time AFTRA should attempt or threaten in any way to discipline the plaintiffs for anything which they might say or print or if AFTRA should try to cause any broadcasting station or publication to refuse to employ them for any ideas which they may express, the courts of the United States will preserve and protect their free speech rights."

(*Lewis* Pet. 11A) that "If and when he lawfully severs his ties, he will be free of AFTRA's control. Jurisdiction to determine an unfair labor practice, if plaintiff believes that is what is involved here, lies with the NLRB and not with this Court."

These preemption rulings by the courts below are correct applications of this Court's decisions. The substance of petitioners' coercion claim is that they have wrongfully been induced to become or to remain members of AFTRA and fear its retaliation if they seek to resign and defy any strike which the Union may call. Under *Garmon* and *Lockridge* such a claim is neither more nor less than a preempted assertion of an NLRA violation. Employment sanctions to force union membership, strike support, or strike assistance, violate the statute. *Union Starch & Refining Co.* v. *NLRB,* 186 F.2d 1008, cert. denied 342 U.S. 815; *NLRB* v. *Bell Aircraft Corp.,* 206 F.2d 235 (C.A. 2, 1953); *NLRB* v. *Eclipse Lumber Co.,* 199 F.2d 684 (C.A. 9, 1952). Moreover, in *Labor Board* v. *Granite State Joint Board,* 409 U.S. 213, this Court upheld the Labor Board's jurisdiction to protect an employee's right "to join or resign from associations" against any form of union interference or coercion. Before petitioners resign from AFTRA their fears are quite conjectural. And should they resign and then experience any Union retaliation, the Labor Board would have full authority to afford them the statute's protection.

Thus, no more than their attack on the requirement that they share the costs of collective bargaining is there any new or substantial question presented by petitioners' attack on the lower courts' conclusion that

their coerced membership claim is committed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Board.[8]

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons it is submitted that the petitions should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

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[8] By an additional question presented petitioners assert (see *Buckley* Pet., 2, 17) that the FCC "fairness doctrine" gives the media "unrestricted discretion in the employment of commentators," thus barring the discharge of a commentator for nonpayment of his union dues. This strained suggestion is repelled by the nub of this Court's stricture in *Columbia Broadcasting System* that "no private individual or group has a right to command the use of broadcast facilities" (412 U.S. 94, 113). In any event, even if petitioners had a colorable claim that the fairness doctrine may be violated by their discharge for refusal to pay dues, primary jurisdiction over that claim would be vested in the Federal Communications Commission.

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MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

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PETITIONERS REPLY MEMORANDUM

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November, 1974

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PETITIONERS REPLY MEMORANDUM

This is a First Amendment case. Petitioners' claim is that contracts made by respondent union under

authority of §8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act violate the First Amendment by preventing them from speaking on the air unless they are members in good standing of the union.

Respondents' opposition memorandum seeks to shift the argument to make it appear that petitioners are making an attack upon the system of collective bargaining as established by the NLRA.

Although their claim does not rest on that fact, petitioners point out that the union does not function as their exclusive representative in collective bargaining and that they derive no benefit from such bargaining.

Because the Court of Appeals rested its reversal of the District Court on the assumption that petitioners derive benefits from AFTRA representation, and because respondents also argue benefit, we shall discuss that point briefly.

In the District Court respondent union made no claim of benefit at all (petition, page 11); the District Court found that there was no evidence that petitioners in fact enjoy any AFTRA benefits other than enrollment in the pension plan. (petition, page 10; cf. JA. 12b-13b; 61c). In the Court of Appeals the union did not claim benefit by reason of the pension plan, but like their present opposition brief, argued that other provisions of the Code did provide benefit; petitioners argued that they did not, and the Court of Appeals rested its conclusion of benefit solely on the theory of enrollment in the pension plan. We note that the union does not, in this Court, despite this encouragement from the Court of Appeals, argue that such enrollment constituted a benefit.

Thus, despite the absence of any evidence in the record, and the fact that their theory of benefits was rejected by the courts below, respondents again strain the find some benefits flowing to petitioners from the union contract.

We do, however, urge that the Court not be distracted from petitioners' claim that, as to them, benefit or not, the union's actions under the authority of sec. 8(a)(3) violate the First Amendment.

POINT I

PITTSBURGH PRESS CO. v. HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION, 413 U.S. 376, 382, DOES NOT SUSTAIN A STATUTE BY WHICH PAYMENT OF DUES IS MADE A PREREQUISITE OF SPEAKING ON THE AIR.

The union has argued, and the Court of Appeals has agreed, that the doctrine that the press may be subjected to laws of general application covers this aspect of the case. In the Court below the union relied on *Branzburg v. Hayes*, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), and *Cox v. New Hampshire*, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). As shown by the petition, *Branzburg* and *Cox* carefully pointed out that prior restraint of speech was not involved (petition, pages 8-9). The union has abandoned these cases in this Court and turned to *Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Commission*, 413 U.S. 376 (1973), and *Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board*, 301 U.S. 103 (1937). But no prior restraint of speech was involved in these cases either. Indeed the quotation

from *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. at 266 (1964), in *Pittsburgh* at page 385 clearly distinguishes *Pittsburgh* from this case. The content of petitioners' broadcasts is in no sense commercial.

POINT II

PETITIONERS' ARGUMENT THAT THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION IS NOT ANSWERED BY REFERENCES TO AN ILLUSORY RIGHT TO RESIGN.

Substantially disregarding petitioners' arguments respecting pre-emption, the union airily says that petitioners may resign. But the union continues to do what it tells this Court it has no right to do. It has never modified §84 of the Code which forbids employment unless the performer is a *member*, nor has it notified employers that §84 may be disregarded. The letter from NBC to Rusher (petition, page 14), shows that §84 continues to be enforced by the employers. [emphasis supplied].

Before bringing this lawsuit, Buckley explicitly asked the union what would happen if he resigned and was informed that the union would, by utilizing its agreements with broadcasting employers, prevent him from broadcasting anywhere in the United States. (Buckley, JA. 30a). The District Court also found as an undisputed fact that Buckley was required by the AFTRA Code, and contracts with broadcasters ancillary thereto, to become *and remain* a member of AFTRA against his will (Buckley, JA. 31a) [emphasis supplied].

It might be that if petitioners did resign they could, after years of litigation, ultimately obtain a court ruling that the requirement of membership was not lawful. For the reasons already shown by the petition (pages 16-17) the right of resignation is thus illusory. It would be anomalous that this Court which has so strictly required immediate adjudication with respect to the showing of films of doubtful propriety (cf. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 [1965]) should acquiesce in dilatory proceedings respecting the rights of these commentators to be heard by their audiences of millions on the most vital topics of the day.

The union respondent's argument against the jurisdiction of the Federal court seems directed to the claim that the suit, in this respect is unnecessary because Petitioners have the right to resign rather than to the issue of whether or not the jurisdiction of the Court has been pre-empted.

Respectfully submitted,

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November, 1974

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Supreme Court of the United States

October Term 1974

No. 313

WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, NATIONAL REVIEW, INC., and M. STANTON EVANS,

Petitioners,

—against—

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TELEVISION and RADIO ARTISTS,

Respondent.

No. 314

FULTON LEWIS III,

Petitioner,

—against—

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TELEVISION and RADIO ARTISTS,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Petitions for writs of certiorari were denied herein on December 23, 1974. Justice Douglas dissented in an opinion in which the Chief Justice concurred. Justice Marshall extended the time within which a petition for a rehearing might be filed until February 6, 1975.

Petitioners propose arguments not included in the original petition. In that petition we did not argue "government action" believing that subject adequately covered by the opinion of the Court of Appeals. Since the Court's order denying the petition, we have had an opportunity to read the Court's opinion in *Jackson* v. *Metropolitan Edison Co.*, 43 U.S. Law Week 4110, decided on December 23, the

same day that our petition was denied. We believe it is possible that some members of the Court may have been influenced by the *Jackson* opinion to conclude that there had been no "government action" in our case.

We also argue pre-emption differently, urging that *Motor Coach Employees* v. *Lockridge*, 403 U.S. 274 (1971), be overruled or limited to cases in which the NLRB will grant relief.

POINT I

The First Amendment provides that

> **"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech."**

NLRA § 8(a)(3), providing that dues may be required as a condition of employment is, in the context and as applied to commentators on public affairs, such a law.

The effect of § 9 of the NLRA is to force all employees of a given employer in a collective bargaining unit determined by the NLRB necessarily to be represented by a union collective bargaining agent.

§ 8(a)(2)—whatever it may authorize as regards membership as such—unquestionably authorizes that the employer and the union may agree that the employee pay dues as a condition of employment. As applied to commentators on public affairs § 8(a)(3) thus abridges their freedom of speech. They may have made otherwise satisfactory agreements with broadcasting companies, but are nevertheless prevented from speaking if the union dues have not been paid. When one considers the somewhat remote circumstances in which this Court has enforced freedom of speech on occasion, it is, we believe, inconsistent that so direct an interference with speech should be tolerated.

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State "shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

The phraseology of the Fourteenth Amendment has led to numerous cases to determine whether or not action with which a state or state officer has some connection, amounts to "state action" for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. Many of these cases are cited in *Jackson*.

We believe that the body of law built primarily around the Fourteenth Amendment "state action" cases, with their discussion of "involvement", "encouragement", "insinuation", etc. has led to a failure to recognize an explicit violation of the First Amendment when not accompanied by circumstances under which the courts have tended to find "state action" despite the absence of action by the state in the literal sense.

Nevertheless, even in a case such as *Moose Lodge No. 107* v. *Irvis*, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), we have no doubt that, if the statute at issue there had in so many words authorized the licensee to make a choice as to whether or not it would provide service to blacks, this Court would have found state action. It was because the statute was wholly silent on the subject that there was no "state action".

In the present case, although Justice Douglas has shown the theory on which petitioners' speech has been abridged, we wish to add a few words in the light of *Jackson*. The tariff schedule in *Jackson* was *de minimis*. It had never received state attention; that part of it at issue consisted of a sentence or two lost in voluminous schedules.

In the present case there unquestionably is "government action", viz., the National Labor Relations Act. The Act is a widely debated statute that engaged the attention of

the nation when it was under consideration by Congress in the winter and spring of 1947. From the viewpoint of "action", the tariff schedule routinely acquiesced in by a state agency is not to be compared with § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.

In *Jackson* the Court said:

> "If we were dealing with the exercise by Metropolitan of some power delegated to it by the State which is traditionally associated with sovereignty, such as eminent domain, our case would be quite a different one." (at 4112)

This Court has found that unions have governmental powers legislative in nature and therefore subject to constitutional limitations. In *Steele* v. *Louisville & Nashville R. Co.*, 323 U.S. 192 (1944), the Court said that (page 198)

> ". . . constitutional questions arise . . . [when] the bargaining representative is clothed with power not unlike that of a legislature which is subject to constitutional limitations on its power to deny, restrict, destroy or discriminate against the rights of those for whom it legislates . . ."

Again, in *American Communication Assn.* v. *Douds*, 339 U.S. 382 (1952), the Court emphasized the governmental nature of the power exercised by unions.

We would submit, however, that when a statute authorizes A and B to agree upon a contract which limits C's freedom of speech, the statute abridges C's freedom of speech. The right to continuous electric service is not freedom of speech.

In *Jackson* the Court said that it found no state action in *Moose Lodge* because there was "insufficient relationship between the challenged actions of the entities involved and

their monopoly status" (at 4112) and finds no greater connection in *Jackson*. In contrast, the NLRA authorizes, fosters, and encourages the union shop, the very subject matter of the complaint, and thus constitutes state action to raise the abridgment of your petitioners' speech to constitutional significance, if encouragement be necessary as well as authorization.

§ 7 of the NLRA expressly states that § 8(a)(3) authorizes a union shop. Thus, § 7 in authorizing workers to organize and engage in collective bargaining, or to refrain from doing so, specifically provides that "the right to refrain from any and all such activities" is subject to an exception "to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as *authorized in Sec. 8(a)(3)*." (Emphasis added.)

The first proviso of § 8(a)(3) declares: "Provided that nothing in this act, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement for a union shop."

Obviously this language, nullifying any other statute of the United States in conflict with the authorized union shop goes further than to create an exception to the unfair labor practices defined in the Act. The very reason for removing the conflict of other statutes of the United States is because some of them declare a public policy hostile to any form of compulsory union membership. One example is the declaration of policy in the Norris-Laguardia Act, 29 USC 102.

The government action present in the NLRA's authorization of the requirement of dues as a condition of speech is clearly distinguishable from the pervasive state regulation of liquor sales in *Moose Lodge* or the grant of a certificate of public convenience and necessity to a private utility com-

pany in *Jackson*. The courts have uniformly held that merely because a private company is in some way regulated by the state it does not follow that all of its actions are impressed with state action. In the NLRA's regulation of the union shop there is authorization, encouragement and fostering of the very subject matter of the complaint which presents a totally different issue from the one raised by the mere presence of general regulation however extensive in scope.

The First Amendment does not forbid laws which "prohibit" freedom of speech. It uses the word "abridge". We fail to see how a statute which authorizes a series of actions the ultimate effect of which may well be, and indeed ordinarily is, to require the payment of union dues as a condition of speech by commentators on public affairs, can be said not to "abridge . . . the freedom of speech," and be subject to attack by a victim of such abridgement.

Petitioners' objection is of course to prior restraint of speech. Petitioners would welcome an action at law by the union to collect whatever dues it may think itself entitled to.

In conclusion: This is not a case of deciding whether there has been "state action" in the Fourteenth Amendment sense. It is a First Amendment case and the First Amendment is worded differently from the Fourteenth. Congress has undoubtedly "made a law"; the only question is whether or not it is one "abridging . . . the freedom of speech". When Congress makes a law authorizing two parties to enter into a contract by which a third party is barred from speaking on the air unless he meets conditions which the first two parties agree upon, there has been petitioners submit, an abridgement of the freedom of speech. Although we do not regard it as essential to jurisdiction, the law not only authorizes but encourages such a contract.

POINT II

The Court should reconsider and overrule *Motor Coach Employees* v. *Lockridge*, 403 U.S. 274 (1971), or at least limit its pre-emption doctrine to cases in which the Board can and will provide relief; cf. dissenting opinion of White, J., at page 328.

The courts below should be permitted to consider on the merits petitioners' applications for declaratory judgments that the relevant sections of the Codes of Fair Practice (§ 84 of the TV Code [Buckley]; § 57 of the Radio Code [Evans and Lewis]) are invalid as applied to them. To achieve this result it would be necessary to overrule or limit *Lockridge*, assuming, as we must, that our petition for certiorari did not successfully distinguish it.

For reasons apparent from the ensuing argument this point is addressed with special emphasis to Justices Powell and Rehnquist.

The doctrine of pre-emption was first extended to disputes between unions and employees by *Lockridge*, decided June 14, 1971. This decision was by a vote of five to four. All of the four dissenting justices remain members of the Court; of the majority of five, only three remain. The other two justices now serving are Justices Powell and Rehnquist appointed to the seats of the late Justices Black and Harlan, who retired shortly after the decision. Thus insofar as the present Court is concerned, assuming that their views remain unchanged, four justices are opposed to pre-emption as applied to such disputes whereas only three favor it; two have not expressed their opinion.

In view of the fact that this doctrine was reached so recently, and by such a bare majority, petitioners submit that it is appropriate that it be reconsidered by the present

Court. The Court has, following changes in membership, customarily reconsidered recent decisions. We believe that the present is a suitable occasion for doing so.

We do not propose to reargue the doctrine of pre-emption of union-employee disputes in this petition. We believe that the dissenting opinions of Justices Douglas and White* state as cogently as possible the arguments against the pre-emption of such disputes. We adopt those dissenting opinions for purposes of the present petition for our thesis that *Lockridge* should be overruled. We submit that they are more persuasive than the Court opinion and rely upon those dissenting opinions for our presentation of our view that the doctrine of pre-emption should not be applied to union-employee disputes.

The present case illustrates with exceptional force the validity of the dissenting opinions of Justices Douglas and White in *Lockridge*, and the unfairness to the employee situated as petitioners, in limiting him to National Labor Relations Board in disputes with the union arising under the Act when the Board is unable or unwilling to grant relief.

> IN THE COURT OF APPEALS AND IN THIS COURT THE UNION CONCEDES THAT PETITIONERS CAN NOT, AS A MATTER OF LAW IN THE ABSTRACT, BE REQUIRED TO BE MEMBERS. NEVERTHELESS, BECAUSE OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INDUSTRY PETITIONERS MAY NOT BRING UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CHARGES, AND AS THE BOARD DOES NOT ENTERTAIN APPLICATIONS FOR DECLARATORY ORDERS UNDER § 5(e) OF THE ADMINI-

* The Chief Justice concurred in Justice White's dissenting opinion (page 309); Justice Blackmun dissented "for the basic reasons set forth by Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice White in their respective dissenting opinions" (page 392).

STRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, THE UNION, ACTING THROUGH THE EMPLOYERS, CONTINUES TO COMPEL MEMBERSHIP. PETITIONERS, FORCED INTO CONTRACTS AGAINST THEIR WILL, ARE LEFT WITHOUT ANY TRIBUNAL TO WHOM TO APPLY FOR RELIEF. HENCE THE DOCTRINE OF PRE-EMPTION SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED; CF. DISSENTING OPINION OF WHITE, J., IN LOCKRIDGE AT PAGE 328.

It is of course familiar law that a member can not be compelled to remain a member, and the union so concedes. What the union does, to avoid this problem, is to require the employer broadcasting companies to employ only members "in good standing." Cf. 4b-5b; 25c-26c.* Hence it is impossible to get a job unless the performer is a union member. The employer simply will not engage a performer unless he is a union member. Moreover employment is for short terms, often single appearances only, and even longer term contracts contain 13 week cancellation clauses. The member thus has no regular job in which he can be reinstated should he resign from the union and then be discharged. The Board's unfair labor practice procedure is thus useless to him, and in any event, in so far as commentators on public affairs are concerned, would deny him speech during the proceeding—an abridgment of freedom of speech in itself.

Sympathetic with petitioners' dilemma the Court of Appeals, declared the union guilty of "misrepresentation" and "coercion" (15b), but said that Buckley "should have taken his cause to the National Labor Relations Board, an administrative agency fully capable of granting declara-

* The requirement is that the employer-broadcasting companies employ only "members . . . in good standing" is § 84 of the TV Code (Buckley) and § 57 of the Radio Code (Evans and Lewis).

tory relief if circumstances warrant such relief. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(e)" (16c).

§ 554(e) (§ 5[e] of the Administrative Procedure Act), thus referred to by the Court, provides:

> "The agency, with like effect as in the case of other orders, and in its sound discretion may issue a declaratory order to terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty."

Although the Act authorizes the Board to make "rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions" of the Act (§ 6), it has issued rules "for declaratory orders in only a few situations". White, J. dissenting in *Lockridge* at page 328. Justice White added, footnote 6 at page 328:

> "The use of declaratory orders in unfair labor practice proceedings is non-existent, and the same seems to be true for determining whether or not activities arguably subject to § 7 are protected.*"

Thus the National Labor Relations Act procedure suggested by the Court of Appeals does not in fact exist. Conceding arguendo that the Board would have jurisdiction to issue a declaratory order in such a dispute as this, it has chosen not to exercise it, and petitioners are left without relief.

In his dissent in *Lockridge* Justice White added at page 328:

> "Surely the policy of seeking uniformity in the regulation of labor practices must be given closer scru-

* The only rules which the Board has issued respecting declaratory orders relate to the situation when an unfair labor practice charge and a representation case respecting the same employer are contemporaneously on file in the same regional office. 29 CFR §§ 102.105-102.110.

> tiny when it leads to the alternative 'solutions' of denying the aggrieved party a hearing . . ."

Justice White's remark is particularly in point. To apply *Lockridge* here will defeat the intention of Congress that there be a uniform labor policy. In the present instance, so far as substance is concerned, there can be and is no question what that policy is, viz., that members of collective bargaining units who pay dues and fees may resign their union membership at their pleasure.* In this particular instance, however, the characteristics of the industry are such that the unfair labor practice charge is unavailable as a practical matter and the NLRB refuses to exercise its declaratory order jurisdiction. Hence television and radio employees will be in a different and non-uniform category from all other employees; they will be unable to resign from their union even if paying dues and fees. This result is, we submit, to stand the doctrine of pre-emption on its head.

Another point made by Justice White is also applicable here. Referring to *Guss* v. *Utah Labor Relations Board*, 353 U.S. 1 (1957), followed by NLRA § 14(c), he forcefully demonstrated that it was not the intent of Congress that there be "a vast no-man's land, subject to regulation by no agency or court." 403 U.S. 315. Such of course will be the situation if the decision of the courts below are upheld.

The situation here is the more acute in that the union concedes that petitioners have the right to resign, but blocks relief by claiming the absence of a forum able to provide a remedy.

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* Subject to legitimate union rules.

The full membership requirement is not a mere matter of union disciplinary sanction. The requirement sets up a compulsory association as a prior condition of speech.

We do not stress arguments made in the original petition, viz., that these petitioners have been, according to the Court of Appeals, subjected to "misrepresentation" and "coercion", unlike the employee in *Lockridge* who was only the victim of "honest, mistaken conduct"; and that the expertise of the NLRB can hardly be needed as to a legal issue settled in 1954 (*Radio Officers Union* v. *NLRB*, 347 U.S. 17 (1953)).

CONCLUSION

The petitioners request for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

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February, 1975